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Record No. 427~ 
In the 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
at Richmond 
CITY OF RICH.MONO 
v. 
LYNN PONTIAC, INCORPORATED 
FROM TifE HtJSTl~GS COURT OF THE CITY OF R.ICE MON'D, -PilT II 
RULE 5:12-BRIEFS. 
§5. N ernmR OF C o ?TES. T\\·~nly-fivc copies of eacb brief i,ball 
be fi l~.-1 with !l1c clerk of the Conrt., and at least three coy,ies 
n1uilet1 or (lelin1red to opposing counsel on ot: pefore the day 
011 wlrich tlle bri ef jg nlf><l. 
§6~ S1ZE AN D Trrl!~. Briefs slrn.11 be nine iuches in length and 
six inel1es in wic11 h, so as to conf on n in dimen:sio11s to the 
prinfod n!cord, nntl :::hall be p l' intnd in t:rpe not less in size, as 
to l1eight a.nd width , than tbc type in whioh the 1·e:~ord is 
p1iu le<l . The recon1 numher of the case an.rl tbe I1.a:p'.l.es and 
addresses of counsel snhmitt.ing the brief sllall he printed on 
the f.ront. co't"er. 
H . (+. TUB.N::EJR, Clerk. 
Court opens at 9 :30 a. m. ; Adjourns at 1 :00 p. m. 




NOTICE TO COUNSEL 
T his case probably wi ll be call ed a t t he session Ol cou rt 10 
be held. JUN 1954 
\'ou will he.: a ch· ised la ter more defi ni tely as to the date. 
f'ri11 t nam<.:s oi counsel 0 11 i ront co,·er of hrieis. 
H. G. T u rner. Clerk. 
RULE 5 :12-BRIEFS 
~l. Form and Contents of Appellant's Brief. The opening brid of appdiaut :;.hall 
<:ontarn: 
(a) A !'"lbject index an,i tabk oi d1;;1ic111s with ca:-es alphab .::tic:dly arrang e·,!. The 
citation of V1rgiuia cnses ~hall b L to th: ot1icial Virgin:J R(•por t , and. in a,.icition, 
may rcicr to other rf"ports ec,ni~ining sud, cases. 
(b) A brief statement ~·f the material pr<)Cf«.:dings in the lcrn•cr <:ou,·t, the errors 
assi,..'Ilt' d, and the que.;fions involv,.d in the appeal. 
(C) A clear :tlHl conci~c statcml!lit oi tin· fat1,. w.ith ,refort'nres tn the pages of 
~1e printed rc-cc,nl 't\',11'-n there is any p,n"siliility th,11 the other i;i<le mar qnt.,tioa the 
r.tatcmi:nt. \,\il1en the facts arc in di~putc 1.lu: brief sh;;ll so ,;Lale. 
(<l) \Vith re;;pcct to e;..c:h a~i~rnJ'IC-r-l of cl'ror n:litd on, th\.' principlt-s of law, the 
~,gumcut and the authoriti<1s shall he ,;tatcd in one place and not scaltcrcd through 
the brid. 
(c) Tre ,;ie-'tlaturc of~· kast one attorney pr,icticing in thii; Court, and his 2,Jdn:ss. 
li2. Form and Contents of Appdlee's Brii:f. Ti1c: Lr,d for the appt:lke ,;hall contain: 
(a) A ,subject i1;1kx an<! t:ihle of citations with cases a lpl,ahetic.1lly ;.r; ang.:d. Cita-
tions d Virginia caHs 11111:.l refer to the Virginia l{cports and, in arldit~L•n, may rcfor 
to other report~ c_c,nta:nia~ 'oU<:'h ca~es. 
(b} A statcrr.ent of the ca,c and nf the point;; invoh·cd, ii the appdlcc disagrees 
with the statement of ~ppcllan•. 
(c) A stak:i1c-11t <'i the fad, whi<-h arc nccc ,.,;iry to corr .. ·l·t or :tm!}lify the st::tc-
m,·nt in app.cil;:nt'::: brief in so far as it i!' dccmcd err0ncL•t1s or in,,dc,1ualt:. \lith ap-
pr0pt ;;,re rcfrr,·nrc; •o the r,agc~ C;f ,he rtrord. 
(d) Arg,mh:111 iL1 i'lljll·Ort d tht· po~ithm or app...11, c. 
Th,• b.-ici ~hall be si!~n~d by at ka:-t c>n.: auonh .. )' prartidng in thi>< C0un. giving 
his ad<lrl ~:;. }3. Reply Brief. The rq,ly brkf (:f any) of th_· .ippcll,,H1 ~hall cont.,in ;;Jl the 
:1nthr,ri1ies rdicd on by him JJvl rc!nnd to in hi;; ope;nmg brief. In oth.:r r,·~.pccls 
it -hall conf.:Jrnt to t!tc r't'quir,·mull- fvr :ippclh:c's brid. 
S4. Time of Filing. A, ~orm :is 1\11' c~tiuiated co5t of printin~ tbi.' n,c<>rti i, pa.id 
by th<!" appdl:mt, the clerk ,hall for'.hwith proc,,e<l to !1:'!\"(: printnl a suflicicnl numl,,:r 
c,f' co;>it;s d thL rcc0rci or th,, ,1':·signatrd parts. Up,,n receipt 0f the r,rintccJ n>pic~ 
or oi the .cubqitutu!I cr,pie:e ;r!l<iW<d i11 lic:u oi prirllt.:fl copi<!S under Ruk :<:2. !he 
<'.!erJ, ~h,,11 fori.l,with mark the i iling J lLll' 011 e:1cn t·opy and !LuE111it Um.:~ c,•1,ies of 
the r,ri-.tcd Te,·ord lcl cach counsd of r,:;c,,r<l, or notify eaclt coun~cl of record of the 
filing rlale of ~he. suhstitntccl l'Opit:".,. · 
lll) If the ?Ltitivn i•Jr app•.•al i~ adopted ac-; the opcni11i; brkf, th<' brid of ti.~ .1.ppcl-
Icc shall be fikrl ;n the clt:rk'._ oflkc within thirty five tbys :tit,.•r tt,e date t 111• prill!cd 
c:,pfrs of the rccor,l. or the suh,tituktl t"OJlif-s allowed 1111,lc-r Rule :-:2, a,·e iil,~•i in the 
clerks c:il1i.:e. If the petition for aprwal i~ not so :11lnptnl. lhc c,p.-11 i11g hrid of the a:1111:!-
fant ,hali be iile1I in lite cfork',- nfli<:c- within thir1y- iiv,, .Ja)h ait,·r the ,l:111• prinkd wpi.::s 
of th(· record, or the "IIU·,titutnl n•pit·~ :i!lnwed 1111ckr Ruic 5:1, :.re fikri in t!t<· cl,'.rk's 
office, ;m,J :h•'. bri1.,f of tlw ar,pd!, ,· ~h,clt he fiktl in tlw clerk's i,fii,.-,· within tldrty-five 
d;tys after the opening 1,rid 0f thr: :ipr,,•llallt i~ fjJ.,.J iu the dt-rk'a off1c:e. 
(b) \Vithin f , ,nrt~cn days aitc·r the brief 0f tl:~ ;ipp,·11,•e i, iilud 111 tl1c clerk';-
offico, the· app'dl:int rn:i.y file :i rq1ly lirid in the cle.rk'._ oflice. The ('..i~e will he caller! 
at a se,sion of the Court c,,mintncing afwr the c:-:p1r:ni.-.11 nf ,aid i,,u: t<)CI1 day, 1111l}s; 
com1s<'I ;-igrcl: t·h:tl it be calkd at a :'Cs~iPn of th~ CrnJrl ,u,umeucintZ at an earlier tiuw; 
prnv:chrl. l•owtvcr, that a erimiu:il <'Ilse mar he <':1l1l'cl :it the m xl >'<·:'>'inn if tl,e C'nrn-
monwcalth's h:'id i.,; fikd a'. k'lsl lonrkl'n 1f;,y~ prinr to tltl' callint~ ~;f the rnsc, in which 
event the reply brief for tiu· :11.>111·!!:tnt .,inll h<' fik"ll not !;it,1r th:m th•· d:i,y hd,·,,e tl~c 
case is calied. This parall,r:1ph doe$ 11ot ,•x:cncl th.: time aH11\,'1:d h:; par:i1; r:;ph (a) 
abo\•t for the filin~ of th(' appdlant',; t.r;cf. 
(c) \Vhh tltc: com;,:nl of the Chid Justie,~ or 1\1e Com·!, l'OU11st•l fr,r ,•Pf,._,, ;ng 
partie~ may filc- with the cl,•rk a writt,~n <iirulation d:an~ing- tbc tirn, · for fi,ir,~ br;cfa 
io any ca:;e : provide,'1, howt·vcr. thnt all l,r1ds m11;t h(; file<! not k1 rrr 1h;,,1 the d:ir 
before such case is to be hc:mL 
f5. Number of Copies. T•.•.·caty-fiv,. copie!' of rach brief ~hall he fifod with the 
ch:tk of thr C onrt. and at Tea st tltrt'<' c,,pi<'•, mailecl or <ldi \'.:red to cippo;-ini::- ,,,,u,F el on 
or bc,fore. the day on whirh the hricf i~ file,!. 
§6. Size and Type. Brit:fs shall be nine inch•'~ in lrrwtli :-:,nd :..i-: irych ... s in width, 
so as !O cnnform in <limen~ion~ to tll'· prinkd r"l.'or<l, :•1••l shall he· priut~u in type not 
ks:<: m ,.ize. «$ it:'.> bt'itsh• cut<! witlih . than •r, .;.- trpe in w 1,i, ·1t th•' r··cr.r,1 i , .'··i"t(',I. The 
rec,:-,rd nur,;i,c·r ol' th{: (',ht' ~J'I•! tlw nanet·s au,I ;•,.Mre:isei; of r.oun,d ~ul>milting lhc brief 
shall he prin1ei on the front ro,;er. 
~7. Effect of N~ncompli:mce. Tf n"ithr!' ;,arty h~~ fib! a brief ;n compl;~nre with 
tile n ·qmrcments of thi~ ruk. the C011n w!ll n,)t hn1r 0ral ar;:ru111r-r1t. Tf ,.,:,,: r··irtv !:as 
but the olher ha~ not fik<l sue!, ,1 brief. the p;ir1y i11 ddalllt will not he hr;1r,l or:,lly. 
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l!/i~ -+~-- 'i.~ ,,;~c~ IN THE 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
AT RICHMOND. 
Record No. 4273 
VIRGINIA.: 
In the Supreme Court of Appeals held at the Supreme Court 
of Appeals Building in the City of Richmond on Thursday the 
21st day of January, 1954. 
CITY OF RICHMOND, 
against 
Plaintiff in Error, 
LYNN PON-TIAC, INCORPORATED, Defendant in Error. 
From the Hustings Court of City of Richmond, Part II. 
Upon the petition of the City of Richmond a writ of error 
and s'ltpersedeas is awarded it to a judgment rendered by the 
Hustings Court of the City of Richmond, Part II, on the 8th 
day of Aug·ust, 1953, in a certain proceeding· then therein de.; 
pending wherein Lynn Pontiac, Incorporat~d, was plaintiff 
· and the City of Richmond was defendant, no bond being re-
quired. 
2 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
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page 2 ~ Docketed by Court Order, September 6~ 1952. 
Teste: 
CHAS. R. PURDY, Clerk 
By IV A M:. ROBB, D. C. 
APPLICATION FOR CORRECTION OF ERRONEOUS 
ASSESSMENT AND REFUND. 
To the Honorable :M:. Ray Doubles, Judge: · 
Lynn Pontiac, Incorporated, a corporation organized and 
existing under the laws of the Commonwealth of Virginia, re-
spectfully represents unto this Honorable Court as follows: 
1. You applicant is and has been since October, 1928, a 
motor vehicles dealer engaged in the business of selling or 
offering for sale new and used motor vehicles. The principal 
office of your applicant is located at 804-828 Hull Street, Rich-
mond, Virginia, where prior to January 20, 1951, both new 
and used motor vehicles were sold or offered for sale. 
2. Your applicant, on January 20, 1951, moved its used 
motor vehicle sales from 804-828 Hun Street to 817 Hull 
Street a.nd discontinued such sales at 804-828 Hull Street. 
3. On January 26, 1951, the City of Richmond and/or the 
License Bureau of the Citv of Richmond assessed a license 
tax under Section 10-84 of., Chapter 10 of the Richmond City 
Code of 1937, as amended, for the license year 1951 against 
your applicant under the c.Jassification '' Retail Merchant'' 
in the amount of $2,927.49, which after audit was increased to 
$2,956.95, based on gross receipts of the business in 1950 at 
the address 828 Hull Street. This assessment has 
page 3 ~ been paid. 
4. On January 26, 1951, the City of Richmond 
and/or the License Bureau of the City of Richmond assessed 
your applicant with a license tax under Sections 10-87 (b} 
and 10-122 of Chapter 10 of the Ricl1mond City Code of 1937, 
as amended, for the license year 1951 in the amount of $200.00, 
based upon estimated gross receipts of less than $52,941.00, 
for the year 1951, under the classification "Used Car Lot", 
City of Richmond v. Lynn Pontiac, Inc. 3 
at the address 817 Hull Street. This assessment has been 
~~ . 
5. On March 10, 1952, the City of Richmond and/or the Li-
cense Bureau of the City of Richmond assessed your applicant 
with additional license tax under Sections io-87 (b) and 
10-122 of Chapter 10 of the Richmond City Code of 1937, as 
amended, for the license year 1951, in the amount of $494.90, 
based upon gross receipts in excess of $52,941.00 for the year 
1951, under the classification "Used Car Dealer", at the 
address 817- Hull Street. This assessment has been paid. 
6. 011 January 17, 1952, the City of Richmond and/or the 
License Bureau of the City of Richmond assessed your appli-
cant with a license tax under Section 10-87 (b) of Chapter 10 
of the Richmond City Code of 1937, as amended, for the license 
year 1952, in the amount of $724.36, based upon gross receipts 
for the year H}51, under the classification, "Used Car Lot", at 
the address 817 Hull Street. This assessment has been paid. 
7. On January 17, 1952, the City of Richmond and/or. the 
License Bureau of the City of Richmond assessed your appli-
cant with a license tax under Section 10-84 of Chapter 10 of 
the Richmond City Code of 1937, as amended, for the license 
year 1952 in the amount of $1,903.42, ba8ed upon gross receipts 
for the year 1951, under the classification "Retail Merchant", 
at the address 828 Hull Street. This assessment bas been 
paid. 
Q. On February 20, 1952, your applicant moved 
page 4 } part of its used motor vehicle sales to 1428 Hull 
Street. 
9. On F.ebruary 20, 1952, the City of Richmond and/or the 
License Bureau of the Citv of Richmond asRessed a license 
tax under Sections 10-87 (b) ancl 10-122 of Chapter 10 of the 
Richmond City Code of l!=J37, as amended, for the license year 
1952, in the amount of $200.00, based upon estimated gross 
receipts in 1952 of less than $52,941.00, under the classifica-
tion, ''Used Car Sales", at the address 1428 Hull Street. 
This assessment has been paid. 
10. On the elates on which all of the above assessments were 
made your applicant waR not a beginner in business but was 
engaged in the business of selling- or offering for sale new 
motor vehicles and selling or offering for sale used motor 
vehicles taken in trade in the sale of such new motor vehicles, 
at a place of business other than the place where such new 
motor vehicles are sold or offered for sale. 
11. Your applicant is aggrieved by the said assessments 
and is advised and'. believes and so alleges that its business is 
not included within the provisions of Sections 10-84, 10-87 (b), 
10-122, and/or 10-125 of Chapter ·10 of the Richmond City 
4 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
Code of 1937, as amended, either in the classification "Retail 
Merchant" "Used Car Lot'' "Used Car Dealer" and/or 
' ' ' , 
"Used Car Sales", nor is your applicant a beginner in busi-
ness. Your applicant is further advised and believes and so 
alleges that its business has not been taxed in accordance with 
the provisions of the Richmond City Code of 1937, as amended, 
all to the detriment of your applicant in the amount of $917.37, 
which amount bas been paid, and that such assessments are 
erroneous and without authoritv in law and constitute double 
taxation of your applicant to th"e extent of $917.37, which sum 
represents overassements in license year 1951 of $694.90, and 
in license year 1952 of $220.00, and interest to date of payment,. 
$2.47. . 
Therefore, your applicant prays that the assessments set 
forth and described in paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 9 be cor-
rected as to amount and classification, either or 
page 5 ~ both, and so much thereof as is erroneous in amount 
be expunged from the tax records of the City of 
Richmond, and so much of such assessments as represent 
overassessments be refunded to your applicant to the extent 
paid, and that your applicant may have such other, and further 
and general relief as the nature of its case may require. · 
LYNN PONTIAC, INCORPORATED 
By Counsel. 
RICHARD C. L. MONCURE, Counsel 
1103 Mutual Building 
Richmond 19, Virginia 
Receipt of a copy of this within application on the 28th 
day of August, 1952, is hereby acknowledged. 
• • 
page 7 ~ 
J. E. DRINARD, 
City Attorney of the City of 
Richmond, Virginia . 
• 
• • 
Filed by Order, October 10, 1952. 
Teste: 
CHAS R. PURDY, Clerk. 
By IV A M. ROBB, D. C. 
City of Richmond v. Lynn Pontiac, Inc. 5 
STATEMENT OF GROUNDS OF DEFENSE. 
Now comes the defendant, City of Richmond, by counsel, and 
for a statement of the g!ounds of its defense now says: . 
1. The license taxes assessed by the Citv of Richmond upon 
- Lynn Pontiac, Incorporated, on ,January 26, 1951 and on 
March 10, 1952 for the license year 1951, in the total amount of 
$697.57, upon the gToss receipts for the year 1951 of its busi-
ness of selling used cars at its used car lot 817 Hull Street in 
the City of Richmond and the license taxes assessed by the 
City of Richmond upon Lynn Pontiac, Incorporated, on Feb-
ruary 20, 1952, for the license year 1952, in the amount of 
$200.00 upon its business of selling used cars at its used car 
lot 1428 Hull Street in the City of Richmond, based upon 
the estimated gross receipts from this business in the year 
1952, or stated differently, being· the entry fee or minimum tax 
assessed against a beginner in the business, were not assessed 
under sections 10-87 (b) and 10.:122 of chapter 10 of the Rich:.. _ 
mond City Code of 1937, as amended, as is alleged in the appli-
cation made by Lynn Pontiac, Incorporated, for the.correction 
of these assessments and the refund of the taxes, but were as-
sessed under sections 10-87(a) and 10-122 and 10-124 of the 
said tax chapter of the City Code. 
2. The true intent and meaning of paragraph. (a) of section 
10-87 is not to classify motor vehicle dealers engaged in tl1e 
business of selling or offering for sale new motor 
page 8 } vehicles and who also sell or offer for sale used 
motor vehicles taken in trade~ at a place of business 
other than the place of business where the new vehicles are 
sold, and to tax them upon both the sales of new vehicles and 
the sales of used vehicles, which it it interpreted to mean, by 
counsel for Lynn Pontia0, Incorporated: but the true intent 
and meaning of said para!?,·raph (a) of section 10-87 is to 
classify such a used ear dealer separately from dealers who 
sell new cars only, who are taxed upon such sales as retail 
merchants under section 10-84, and separately from used car 
dealers who sell used motor vehicles only and do not sell new 
vehicles at all, who are classified and taxed under paragraph 
(b) of section 10-87, and Reparately from dealers who sell 
both new and used motor vehicles at the same place of busi-
ness, who are classified and taxed under paragraph (c) of 
section 10-87, and to tax sueh dealers- under paragraph (a) 
upon their sales of used cars only, at the respective used 
car lots, 817 and 1428 Hull Street, designated by the taxpayer. 
3. Such separate classification and taxation of the two used 
car businesses conducted by Lynn Pontiac, Incorporated, at 
6 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
two distinct places of business separate from each other and 
separate from its original place of business 804-828 HulJ 
Street, at which it conducts its business of selling new cars, 
is a reasonable and valid classification and tax. 
4. It is the true intent and meaning of section 10-124 of the 
City tax chapter requiring the designation of the place of busL 
ness of the license and forbidding the conduct of the business -
elsewhere, to require a separate license for each place of 
business. 
5. The separate classification of the used car businesses of 
Lynn Pontiac, Incorporated, under section 10-87(a) having 
been made, and it being necei:;;sary to require a new 
page 9 ~ and separate license for each new and separate place 
of business, it was proper and necessary to assess 
the first licenses at such new places of business as beginners' 
licenses under section 10-122. 
6. The assessments which Lynn Pontiac, 'Incorporated, 
seeks to have corrected, are not erroneous but are valid and 
lawful assessments and the taxes paid by Lynn Pontiac, Incor-
ated, thereon were due and owing to the City by the taxpayer 
and Lynn Pontiac, Incorporated, is not entitled to any refund. 
The City of Richmond, by filing this statement of g-rounds of 
defense, does not intend to waive any right it may have in law 
to rely upon any other ·matter or matters of defense. 
• 
page 11 ~ 
CITY OF RICHMOND 
By JOHN P. McGUIRE, .JR., 




This day came the parties to this proceeding by their respec-
tive attorneys, upon the Application for Correction of Erron-
eous Assessment and Refund of local license taxes assesed 
for the license years 1951 and 1952 filed by Lynn Pontiac, In-
corporated, Plaintiff, ·t11e Statement of Grounds of Defense 
of the City of Richmond, filed by the defendant by leave of 
Court, the evidence in the form of oral testimony tendered 
at the trial held on January 28, 1953, and transcribed, together 
City of Richmond v. Lynn Pontiac, Inc. 7 
with the exhibits filed therewith, and the oral and written argu-
ments of counsel tl1ereafter submitted. 
And the Court doth certify tl1at said Application was de-
fended at the trial by the City Attorney for the City of Rich-
mond and that the Commissioner of Revenue of said City mak-
ing the local license tax assessments involved, was examined 
as a witness at the trial tori,ching the said Application. 
The Court doth furtl1er certify tlmt the following facts 
were proven by the evidence in this proceeding: 
Lynn Pontiac, Incorporated, a Virginia corporation, plain-
tiff in this proceeding, is and has beeri since October, Hl28, a 
motor vehicle dealer engaged in the business of sell-
page 12 } ing· or offering for sale new and used motor ve- · 
hicles. The principal office of plaintiff is located 
at 828 Hull Street, Richmond, Virginia, where, prior to and 
until January 20, 1951, l)oth new and used motor vehicles were 
sold or offered for sale. 
On "T anuary 20, 1951, plaintiff moved its used motor vehicle 
sales from 828 Hull Street to its lot at 817 Hull Street and 
discontinued such used motor vehicle sales at 828 Hull Street. · 
On January 26, 1951, the City of Richmond acting through 
the office of E. G,lenn Jordan, Commissioner of Revenue for 
the City of Richmond, assessed a license tax under Section 
10-84 of Article 4 of Chapter 10 of the Richmond City Code 
of 1937, as amended, for the license year 1951 against the 
plaintiff under the Classification '' Retail Merchant'' in the 
amount of $2,927.49 based upon gross receipts from the sale of 
new and used motor vehicles in 1950 at the address 828 Hull 
Street. This assessment was paid by the plaintiff. 
On January 26, 1951, the defendant acting through the office 
of E. Glenn Jordan, Commissioner of Revenue for the City of 
Richmond, assessed the plaintiff with a license tax under Sec-
tions 10-87(a), 10-122 and 10-124 of Article 4 of Chapter 10 
of said Code, for the license year 1951 in the amount of $200.00, 
based upon estimated gross receipts of less than $52,941.00 
for the year 1951, under t.he Classification ''Used Car Lot,'' 
at the address 817 Hull S.treet. This assessment was paid by 
the plaintiff. 
On March 11, 1952, the defendant acting through the office 
of E. Glenn Jordan, Commissioner of Rcvenu~ for the City of 
Richmond, assessed your applicant with adrlitional license tax 
under Sections 10-87(a), 10-122 and 10-124 of. Article 4 of 
Chapter 10 of said Code for the license year 1951, 
pag·e 13 ~ in the amount of $494.90, based upon that portion 
of the actual gross receipts in 1951 at 817 Hull 
Street, as shown by audit of the License Bureau of the City of 
8 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
Richmond which were in exc.ess of $52,941.00, under the Clas-
sification ''Used Car Dealer. '' This assessment was paid by 
the plaintiff, together with interest in the amount of $2.47. 
On January 17, 1952, the defendant acting through the office 
of E. Glenn Jordan, Commissioner of Revenue for the City of 
Richmond, assessed the plaintiff with a license tax under 
Sections 10-87 (a) and 10-124 of Article 4 of Chapter 10 of 
said Code, for the license year 1952, in the amount of $724.36, 
based upon gross. receipts for the year 1951, under the Classi-
fication "Used Car Lot", at the address 817 Hull Street. This 
assessment was paid by the plaintiff. 
On January 17, 1952, tl1e defendant, acting through the offire 
of E. Glenn J o:rdan, Commissioner of Revenue for the City of 
Richmond assessed the plaintiff with a license tax under 
Section 10:-84 of Article 4 of Chapter 10 of the said Code for 
the license year 1952 in the amount of $1,903.42, based upon 
gross receipts for the. year 1951, under the Classification 
''Retail Merchant", at the addrei:is 828 Hull Street. This as-
sessment was paid by the plaintiff. 
On February 20, 1952, the plaintiff moved part of its used 
motor vehicle sales from 817 Hull Street to 1428 Hull Street. 
On February 20, 1952, the defendant, acting througl1 the 
office of E. Glenn Jordan, Commissioner of Revenue for the 
City of Richmond, assessed a license tax under Sections 10-
87 (a), 10-122 and 10-124 of Article 4 of Chapter·lO of said 
Code, for the license year 1952, in the amount of $200.00, based 
upon estimated gross receipts in 1952 of less than $52,941.00, 
under the Classification "Used Car Sales", at the 
page 14 ~ address 1428 Hull Street. This assessment was 
. paid by the plaintiff. 
Chapter 10 of the Richmond Cit.y Code of 1937, as amend~d, 
which said Chapter 10 was in force and effect during· the li-
cense years 1951 and 1952, was submitted in evidence in the 
proceeding. 
UPON CONSIDERATIQN WHEREOF. 
The Court being of opinion that the plaintiff, pursuant to 
· the provisions of Article 4 of Chapter 10 of the Richmond City 
Code of 1937, as amended Deeember 26, 1950, and made effec-
tive January 1, 1951, having to do with license taxes, was 
properly assessable with ·only a single license tax for each of 
tl1e license tax years 1951 and 1952 rP.spectively, upon its total 
retail sales of new and used motor vehicles, as a motor vehicle 
dealer, within the classification established by sub-section 
(a) of Section 10-87 of said Article 4 of Chapter 10 of said 
Ri("hmond City Code, doth, for the reasons set forth in its 
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opinion in writing, dated July 1, 1953, and this day :filed and 
hereby made a part of the record, so adjudge, order, and de-
cree; 
And the Court being· satisfied from tl1e evidence in this 
proceeding· that the local license tax assesRments dated Jan-
uary 26, 1951, in the amount of $200.00, and March 11, 1952; 
in the amount of $494.'90, a total of $694.90, made by the de-
fendant against the plaintiff for the license year 1951 upon 
the operation of plaintiff's business at 817 Hull Street, Rich-
mond, Virginia, are erroneous and that no local license tax, 
other than that in thP. amount of $2,927.49 assessed on January 
26, 1951, at 828 Hull Street, was required under the said Rich-
mond City Code for the business conducted by the plaintiff at 
817 Hull Street for lieem,e year 1951, the Court doth adjudge, 
order and decree that the said assessments at the address 817 
Hull Street against the plaintiff for the license 
page 15 ~ year 1D51 be cancelled and expunged from the li-
cense tax records of the City of Richmond; 
And the Court being sa,tis:fied from the evidence in this 
proceeding that the local license tax a8sessment dated January 
17, 1952, in the amount of $724.:36, made by the defendant 
against the plaintiff for the license ~·ear 1952 upon the opera-
ti on of plaintiff's busi1~ess at 817 Hull Street, Richmond, Vir-
ginia, is erroneous and tlmt no separate license tax was re-
quired under the said Richmond City Code for the business 
conducted by the plaintiff at 817 Hull Street for the license 
year 1952, the Court doth udjudg-e, order and decree that 
the said assessment aQ;ainst the plnintiff for the license year· 
1952 be cancelled and expunged from the license tax records 
of the City of Richmond; 
An<l the Court being satisfied from the evidence in tbis pro-
ceedin~· that the local license tax asRe~~ment dated January 
17, 1952, in the amount of $1,903.42, made by the defendant 
n!l'ainst the plaintiff for the license yNn· 1952 upon the opera-
tion of' plaintiff's business at 828 Hull Street, Richmond, Vir-
p:inia, is erroneous mid should be increased by the difference 
between the assessment for licenf,;e Year 1952 erroneously 
made ag·ainst the business conducted at S17 Hull Street, Ricl1-
mond, Virginia, in the amount of $7:24)16, and the basic entry 
fee in the amount of $20.00 erroneou~ly made against 817.Hull 
Street and included in the snm of $724-.:~6, said difference being-
$704.36, ther·eby _increasing the as~e~~n1 e11t for license year 
1952 ag·ainst the plaintiff from the sum of ~1,903.42 to th.e sum 
of $2,607.78; And the Conl't heimi: !-,:ntisfied from the evidence 
in this proceeding that the local licen:-:e ta~ assessment dated 
February 20, 1952, in tlw amount ~f $200.GO, made by the de-
l O Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
fendant against the plaintiff for the license year 
page 16 ~ 1952 upon the operation of plaintiff's business at 
1428 Hull Street, Richmond, Virgfoia, is erroneous 
and that no separate license tax was required under the said 
Richmond City Code for the business conducted by the plain-
tiff at 1428 Hull Street for license year 1952, the Court doth 
adjudge, order and deci·ec that the said assessment against the 
plaintiff for the license year 1952 be cancelled and expunged 
from the license tax records of the City of Richmond; 
And the Court being; also satisfied from the evidence that 
the heretofore mentioned erroneous assessments were not 
caused by the wilful failure or refusal of the plaintiff to fur-
nish the tax assessing authority with the necessary informa-
tion, as required by law, the Court doth adjudge, order and 
decree that the heretofore mentioned erroneous assessments 
be corrected by the Gommission~r of Revenue for the City or 
Richmond, as ordered herein; 
And it appearing; to the Court from the evidence in this 
proceeding that the said erroneous assessments for license 
year 1951 dated January 26, 1951, in the amount of $200.00, 
and March 11, 1952, in the amount of $494.90, with interest in 
the amount of $2.47 upon the said erroneous assessment dated 
March 11, 1952, that the said erroneous assessment for the 
license year 1952, dated January 17, 1952, in the amount of 
$724.36, that the said erroneous assessment for the license 
year 1952, dated January 17, 1952, in the amount of $1,903.42~ 
and that the said erroneous assessment for license year 1952, 
dated February 20, 1952, in the amount of $200.00, have each 
and all been fully paid by the plaintiff to the defendant, the 
Court doth adjudge, order and decree that the Collector of 
City Taxes for the City of Richmond do refund to the plaintiff 
the sum of NINE HUNDRED SEVENTEEN AND 37 /100ths 
($917.37) DOLLARS, that sum being the differ-
pag·e 17 ~ ence between the total of the erroneous assessments 
· involved in this proceeding and interest upon a 
portion thereof as set forth herein and paid hy the plaintiff in 
the sum of $3525.15, for the license years 1951 and 1952, and 
the amount of the assessment dated January 17, 1952, as cor-
rected by this order, $2.607.78, together with costs of this 
proceeding ; 
It is further ordered that a copy of this order be delivered 
to Thos. C. Armstrong, Collector of City Taxes for the City 
of Richmond. Virginia, and a copy be also delivered to E. 
Glenn Jordan, Commissioner of Revenue of said City. 
And to all of the foregoing order the defendant, the City of 
Richmond, by counsel, excepts, on the g-rounds which appear 
from the statement of grounds of defense herein filed. and 
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generally., on the grounds that the assessments herein recited, 
as shown by the evidence, were not erroneous assessment.s 
but were correct assessments, and were the assessments re-
quired to be· made by sections 10-84, 10-87 (a), 10-122, 10-124, 
10-125, and other provisions of Article 4 of Chapter 10 of Rich-
mond City Code, 1937, as amended. 
Enter 8/8/53. 





Doubles, J. This is a proceeding by the plaintiff, a dealer h1 
new and used motor vehicles, for .correction of an alleged er-
roneous tax assessment against him by the defendant City 
of Richmond and for a refund of faxes paid under such alleged 
erroneous assessment. 
For some years prior to 1951 the plaintiff had carried on his 
operations as a Yendor of new motor vehicles and of used 
motor vehicles taken in as trade thereon, at 828 Hull Street, 
and as such was subject to the license tax prescribed by Sec-
tion 10-87 ( c) of the City Code. ( See later). In 1951 the plain-
tiff moved its used car sales operations across the street 
to 817 Hull Street, and in 1952. moved a part of its used car 
sales operations to 1428 Hull Street. As a result of this 
moving of its used car sales operations, the City of Richmond 
has made changes in the license tax assessment· against the 
plaintiff, taxing his new car operations as a merchant under 
Section 10-84 of the Code, and each of llis used car operations 
under Section 10-87 (a) of the Code. The plaintiff contends 
that its entire operations are taxable under Section 10-87(a} 
of the Code. 
Article 4 of Chapter 10 of the Code of the City of Richmond, 
as amended, provides for and lists the activities subject to 
"license taxes". within the city. Ntunberous occupations, 
professions, businesses, activities and operations are either 
generally Qr specifically designated. One of the main business 
generally designated is that of ''MERCHANTS,'' 
page 19 ~ and Section 10-84 dealing· with retail merchants 
reads as follows : 
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''10-84 MERCHANTS.-Retail-(a) Every person en-
gaged in the business of a retail merchant shall obtain a license 
for the privilege of doing business in the City of Richmond 
and shall pay a license tax therefor. The term-"retail mer-
chant'' as used in this section shall include everv merchant 
who sells to others at retail only and not for resale. 
"(b) For every license issued to a person engaged in the-
business of a retail merchant, the amount of the license t1tx to 
be paid therefor shall be equal to .............. $20.00 and 
thirty-four hundreths of one per cen_Jnm of the gross receipts 
of the business." (Italics added) 
A person engaged solely in the busine.-:s of selling new motor 
vehicles, i. e., who does not sell "used" or "second-hand'' 
cars, is taxed under the foregoing Section ] 0-84 just the same 
as the vendor of any other merchandise not specifically de-
signated elsewhere in the Code. The basic tax is $20.00, plus 
.34 of one per centum of the gross receipts of the b'ltsiness. 
For reasons not expressly apparent from the record but 
for good reason no doubt,. the Council has dealt specificallr 
with dealers of motor vehicles who sell used cars in Section 
10-87 of the Code. Sub-section (a), ( h) and ( c) of tl1is ser-
tion classify such dealers. · 
Sub-section (b) reads as follows: 
'' (b) Every motor vehicle dealer engaged in the bitslness 
of selling or offering for sale used or secondhand motor 
vehicles to others at retail only and not for resale exclusively1 
and does not engage in the business of selling or offering for 
sale new motor vehicles, shall pay a license tax equal to ..... . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . $200.00 and thirty-four hundredths of one nc1• 
centum of the g·ross receipts of the ln,.c;-iness in excess of $5:2,-
941.00. '' (Italics added) · 
This sub-section is clear and unambiguous. It taxes per-
sons '' engaged in the husiness of selling • • 6 used or second-
hand, motor vehicles 6 *' i# • ' ' The business subjected to the 
fax is clearly the business specified in the introductory phrase 
of the sentence, viz., the one specified as '' engaged in'' by the 
dealer. The minimum tax is set at $200.00. 
Sub-section ( c) reads as follows: 
page 20 ~ " ( c) Every motor vehicle dealer engaged in the 
business of selling or offering for sale new and used 
motor vehicles, or both, at the same place of business, whether 
taken in tracle or purchased for resale, shall pay a license tax 
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of ............ $20.00 and thirty-five four hundredths of one 
per cent.um of the gross receipts of said bnsiness, '' (Italics 
added) 
Similarly this sub-section is clear and unambiguous. It 
taxes persons whose 1p.and used car operations take place 
~e s~e ~oggtion. Such person receives the same treat-
n0~ as e ealer who sells "new" cars exclusively, i. e., he 
is taxed at the same rate as is provided under 10-84 (a) and 
( b) for ''Merchants,'' viz., $20.00 plus .34 of one per centum 
of the gross receipts. It is pertinent to note that the busi-
ness engaged in is defined in this sub-section as '' selling new 
and used niofor vehicles" although the title line of Section 
10-87 reads "MOTOR VEHICLE DEALERS-(USED 
VEHICLES). It is clear therefore tbat the wo~·ds "USED 
VEHICLES'' appearing in the title line is not intended to 
suggest that the on(y sales taxed under the section are sales 
of ''used" vehicles, but that sub-sections may be encountered 
wherein either or both new and used sales may be taxed. It 
is also pertinent to note that the format and sentence struc-
ture is the same as that used in su b-sec·tion ( c), viz., the intro_. 
<luctory phrase defines the business e!!1/.!!1l.!!_d in that is subject 
to the later specified tax rate. ~
Sub-section (a), the interpretation and application.of which 
is in controversy in the case nt bar, reiuls as follows: 
'' Every motor vehicle dealer en gag eel in the b·itsiness of 
selling or offering for sale new motor vehicles, and who sells 
or offers for sale used motor vel1icles taken in trade in the 
sale of such new vehicles, at a plaee of business other than 
the place of business wliere such new vehicles are sold or 
offered for sale, shall pay a license tax equal to ..•...... ~ .. 
$200.00 and thirty-four hundredths of one per centum of the 
gross receipts of the business in excess of $52,941.00. '' (Italics 
added) 
The language is ambiguous and :mseeptible of ·at least three 
different interpretations: 
· First. If the format and sentence stmcture of unambigu-
ous sub-sedions (b) and ( c) is followed, the business subject 
to the tax is the one engaged in, viz., the selling of new motor 
vehicles, leaving the operator either free of taxation on the 
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used car sales or· subject to taxation under some 
page 21 ~ other provisio11 of the Code. Neither the plaintiff 
~or the <lefendant claim that this is the proper inter-
pretation, yet literally that is what the sub-section says. How-
0ver, to thus construe it would place the minimum tax on 
new car operations at $200.00 instead of $20.00 as provided in 
Heetion 10-84 and l 0-87 ( c), and it cannot be supposed that 
the Council intended that. lso there is no other sub-s · on 
tO-t rn care of the tax on use car o Jera 10ns when sold by 
such · · . &!1! _ , and 
1 c e assumed that the ouncil intended 1olet tlie used 
car operations of sut'h a dealer go untaxed ,·vhen a dealer 
who carried on both operations at the same location is taxed 
under sub-section (c). 
Second. 'l1lie defendant City of Richmond contends that th 
sub-section taxes the gross receipts of th tse · c · o eratio· ·. 
of such a dealer, and leaves his new car 01vcn -wns to be taxed 
as a MERCHANT under section 10-84. If that was intende~ 
it is difficult to understand the departure from the format 
and sentence structure used in sub-section ( b) and ( c). Gros 
receipts taxes are levied because a person is e~d in an 
operation, and it is the gross receipts derived from the opera-
tion in whieh he iR engaged that are sub;jcct to the tax rate. 
The contention of the defendant City of Richmond would re-
quire that the sub-section be -~tl to read as follows: 
'' Every motor vchiele dealer e'a~he business of 
selling or offering for sale used motor vehicles taken in trade 
in the sale of new vehicles, who sells or offers for sale the said 
used vehicles at a place of business other than the place of 
business where such new vehicles are sold or offered for sale, 
shall pay a license tax equal to $200.00 und thirty-four hun-
dredths of one per centum of the gross receipts in excess of 
~52,941.00 derived from the said business of selling such 
used vehicles.'' . 
Such an interpretation simply does violence to the ambig-4 
_uous language of the Hub-section, particularly if some other,, 
interpretation is equally applicable. · 
Third. The plaintiff contends that the sub-section (a) 
taxes his combined operations the same as sub-section ( c) 
taxes the combined operations of a dealer who con-
page 22 ~ ducts both operations at the same location, and that 
the onl v difference is that the minimum tax is in-
creased from $20:oo to $200.00 because the operations are 
carried on at different locations.~1is is not a strained con-
struction; it takes his total sales; none of his gross receipts 
-----· -
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_g__o untaxe.d; if he is a small dealer it subjects him to the 
penalty of a $200.00 minimum tax for the privilege of carry-
ing on his used car operations at a location detached from his 
new car operations, which is consistent with the Council's ap-
parent intent to fix a high minimum tax on small operators in 
the used car business; if he is a large dealer it does not dis-
criminate against him because he conducts his two opera-
tions at different places instead of at the same location as 
provided for in sub-section (c); it does not violate the title 
line of' the section any more so than sub-section ( c) does; it 
conforms more closely to a literal construction of the language 
than docs the contention of the defendant. · 
The defendant City of Richmond contends, however, that to 
give sub-section (a) the fore-going interpretation results in 
a nullification of sections 10-124 a.nd 10-125 which allegedly 
require separate licenses for businesses conducted at differ-
ent locations. These sections read as follows: 
"10-124 DESIGNATION OF PLACE OF BUSINESS-
Every license to engage in any business, occupation or profes-
sion unless expressly authorized elsewhere or otherwise· by 
law, shall designate the place of such business occupation or 
profession at some specified house or other definite place 
within the City of Richmond. Engaging in any such business, 
occupation or profession elsewhere than at such house or 
definite place, unless expressly authorized elsewhere or other-
wise by law, shall constitute a violation of the provisions of 
this chapter. A license which does not specify such house 
or definite place shall be void; provided, however, that where 
the licensee required is such as to clearly show that the 
licensee does not have a special house or definite place of 
business in the City of Richmond, the license shall designate 
the residence or place of business of the licensee wherever 
it may be. And provided further that any license issued under 
the pro-visions of section 10-86, 10-88, 10-90, 10:-91, 10-93, 
10-116, 10-117, or 10-118 of this chapter need not designate any 
specified house or definite place of business. 
page 23 ~ "10-125 PERSONS ENGAGED IN MORE 
THAN ONE TRADE, BUSINESS, OCCUP A-
TION OR PROFESSION.-Every person engaged in more 
tlrnn one business, occupation or profession in the City of 
Richmond for which license taxes are prescribed by this chap-
ter at more than one rate or at different entry fees shall be 
assessed with and shall pay the license tax prescribed for the 
respective businesses. "There a person engages in two or' 
more of such businesses, occupations or professions at a 
single place of business, each of which such business is sub-
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ject to the same entry fee and is taxable at the same rate on 
the gross receipts thereof, only one entry fee shall be paill 
with respect to them and the gross receipts of such busi-
nesses, occupations, or professions shall be consolidated" 
computed and reported as 01,e item, and only one license tax 
shall be computed thereon; but the license receipt shall show 
the respective husinesscs, occupations and professions that 
are covered by the consolidated tax.'' 
These sections certainly make it clear that carrying on the 
same business at two different locations is in effoct carrying-
on two businesses for the purpose of license taxation, ''unleHs 
expressly authorized elsewhere or otherwise by law''; and 
that carrying· on two or more businesses at the same location 
subject each business to separate license taxation, unless the 
tax rate on each business is the same. 
Selling new cars exclusively is a business, and as seen be-
fore is subject to a minimum tax of $20.00. (Section 10-84). 
Selling u-sed cars exclusively is a business, and as seen before 
is subject to a minimum tax of $200.00. (Section 10-87·b). 
,-- Selling new and used cars can conceivably be treated as the 
\ 
operation, of either one or two lmsine£:ses. Section 10-87 ( c) 
treats it as a single business despite the fact that the minimum 
tax rate on each of the component parts is different and but 
for the section each of the component parts would be sub5ect 
to separate licensing under section 10-125 even though carried 
on at the same location. Thus Section 10-87 ( c) may be said to -
authorize the two businesses or operations to be licensed as a 
single business. True enough they are carried on at the rnme 
location; but that is simply the condition under which the ta·x 
applies; the pertinent observation is the fact that the sub-
section fixes the tax and thereby constitutes an authorization 
to do the business or combined operations under 
page 24 ~ the conditions specified in the sub-section. 
Applying- similar reasoning· to section 10-87 (a),. 
the Court having previously concluded that the said sub-sec-
tion fixes a tax rate upon the several operations of the dealer, 
the· Court is of the further opinion that having fixed the tax 
rate the section thereby authorizes the several operations 
under tl1e conditions enumerated in the said sub-section, viz., 
the selling of used vehicles. at a place of business other thau 
the place where new ones arc sold. Havin~ thcreh:v authorized. 
the several operations at different locations, tbe .exception 
c~ontnined in section .10-124 applies and the said section. is not 
applirable. 
The Court is of opinion therefore that the plaintiff is en-
titled to relief in accordance with the foregoing- opinion, and 
City of Richmond v. Lynn Pontiac, Inc. 17 
upon presentation of an appropriate order properly endorsed 
the same will be entered. 
July 1, 1953. 
},iled by order, August 8th, 1953. 
Teste: 
CHAS. R. PURDY, Clerk. 
By' IV A M. ROBB, D. C. 
page 25 ~ 
* * * 
NOTICE OF APPE1\.L AND ASSIGN~iENT OF ERROR. 
To: Charles R. Purdy, Clerk of said Court: 
The defendant, the City of Richmond, by counsel, hereby 
gives notice, pursuant to the provisions of §4 of Rule 5 :1 of 
the Rules of the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, of 
its appeal from a certain final order and judgment entered in 
this proceeding on August 8; 1953, aud assigns the following 
elTOr: 
1. The court erred in finding that the plaintiff, Lynn Pon-
tiac, Incorporated,. was properly assessable with only a single 
eity license tax for each of the license tax years 1951 and 1952, 
respectively, measured for each such license tax year by the 
gross receipts for the immediately preceding year from its 
total retail sales of new and used motor vehicles, at all of its 
places of business in operation during such preceding year, 
rather than with the separate license taxes actually assessed 
by the city upon each operation: conducted at each separate 
place of business maintained by Lynn Pontiac,- Incorporated, 
measured in each instance by the gross receipts from retail 
sales a.t that place of business, computed as by ordinance 
provided for se1jarate businesses; · and the court therefore 
erred in finding that such separate assessments were erron-
eous · 
JOHN P. l\foGUIRE, JR, p. d. 
Assistant Citv Attornev 
Room 402, City Hall ·· 
Richmond, Virginia 
CITY OF- RICHMOND 
By Counsel 
18 Supreme Court of Appeals ~f Virginia 
Ernest Lynn. 
page 26 ~ I hereby certify that a true copy of the fore-
going notice of appeal ancl assignment of error 
was mailed to Messrs. Richard C. L. Moncure and Meade T. 
Spicer, Jr., attorneys for the plaintiff, at 1103 Mutual Build-
ing, Richmond, Virginia, on the 29th day of September, 1953. 
JOHN P. McGUIRE, JR., 
.Assistant City Attorney. 
Filed September 29th, 1953. 
Teste: 
CHAS. R. PURDY, Clerk. 
* * 
page 2 ~ 
• * * 
ERNEST LYNN, 
called on behalf of the applicant, being first duly sworn, testi-
fied as follows : ' 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Moncure: 
Q. "\Yill you stat<1 your name and occupation'? 
A. Ernest Lynn; President, Lynn Pontiac. 
Q. Mr. Lynn, when did that business begin? 
A. In October, 1928. . 
Q. ·what is the nature of the businessf 
.A. Automobiles, new and used cars and repair work. 
Q. Where is it locatecH 
A. At present it is at 828 Hull Street. 
Q. Will you give a brief history of that business to show 
just what it has done over the past years Y 
A. \Yell, in 1928 we opened up as Lynn Pontiac across the 
street and sometime later-I don't know the number of years 
-we moved to 1101 Hull Street and in 1943 we moved to 828 
Hull Street-no, in 1941. In 1943 I bought out Mr: Reams 
and a few years after that the corporation was changed from 
the names of Reams & Lynn to Lynn Pontiac; the 
page 3 ~ same operation, same business, no change in per-
sonnel or anything. · 
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Ernest Lyn~i . 
. Q. Did you make any change in your form of business in 
recent years-in 1951 f 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Did you make any move of your used car sales! 
A. vVell, we had had a difficulty with customers; they would 
bring their cars in our place for repair work and then would 
leave and come back and when the car is ready they would 
come and get it. vVell, we had our used car department in the 
back of ·our service d.epartment where a customer could come 
in and pay his bill and go right hack and pick up his car and 
we had our u!:!ed car at the l1ack.. \Vell, it was so full 
we found we didn't have room enough for our customers to 
get back there. So we had to put a lot of customers' cars 
across the street and it made it so dangerous and inconvenient 
for the customer to come over to our main office to pay his 
bill, then we would have to send him across Hull Street in the 
traffic, and I decided it was too much trouble and too much of 
a hazard for our customers. We had to send somebody over 
them at times to get the customers' cars for them or ·quite 
often, that I decided to move my used car department entirely 
from in the rear of my service department and put them 
across the street so I could make room for all of my cus-
tomers' cars right adjoining my service department so that 
all a customer would have to do would be to pay his 
page 4 ~ bill, walk through the service department and pick 
up his car, and that is why I moved my used cars 
from the back on this side of the street next to my service de-
partment across the· street so I could make it more convenient 
for my custouiers when they come for the cars. 
Q. ·what sales force and management did you have in the 
lot across the street? 
A. The same management and everything as it was on 
this side of the street; no difference in management whatever, 
just moved my department across there. 
Th Court: I think for the sake of the record you better 
state what the address is that you refer to when you say this 
side of the street and what the address is when you refer to 
across the street. All of us here in court being so close to it 
know, but the record won't indicate it when you say this side 
of the street. 
The Witness: 828 is on this side and 817 across the street. 
Bv Mr. Moncure: 
· Q. Has your company at anytime refused to give any in-
formation to the City of Richmond License Bureau? 
20 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
Ernest Lyn ti. 
A. No, sir. 
Q. \Vhen did you first take this matter up with the City of 
Richmond f · 
page 5 ~. ' A. Well, in the spring of· 1952 they sent us an 
additional bill covering the sales over and a.hove-
l think it was $51,000, which would give me that many sales 
for the $:200 original deposit, and I had already paid my license 
to do business, including used cars and all, covering prior 
sales-according to the sales of 1951 because you pay accord-
ing to the business that is done the year before for that fol-
lowing year. I had already paid that. 
Q~ Don't you mean on sales of 1950 f 
A. ·well, in 1951 I had paid the license covering . the volume 
clone in 1950; that is, for me to do business in 1951, and then 
in April of 1952 they re-assessed me and I made an appoint-
ment with Mr. Welch, that I wanted to talk to him, that I 
was being double taxed. So we made the appointment and 
I went over and explained to Mr. ·w elch I didn't feel that I 
should be double taxed when I had already paid my license 
to do business and then for them to come back and re-assess 
me and pay again just because I moved my used car depart-
ment from 828 Hull to 817 Hull. 
Mr. McGuire: If the Court please, I think Mr. Lynn is-
l think this testimony is argument and I think he is arguing 
upon the wisdom of the law. I don't believe this line of 
testimony is proper. 
The Court: . It is, according to his statement, 
page 6 ~ what he told Mr. ·w elch. So let's go on and get 
what the facts are. 
1\.. (continued) So· Mr. ·welch-we were in Mr. ,velch's 
office and got to arguing one way and the other, and Mr. 
Welch said: '' Listen, you are a beginner in business.'' I 
said: "Mr. ·w elch, I have been in business since 1928 and 
how can you say I am a beginner in business 1 '' He said : 
'' That is what you are-
~Ir. McGuire: I am compelled to object to all this line. 
The Court: Objection overruled. · 
1\.. ( continued) So nir. Drinard came in and said: "No":, 
Mr. "\\Telch, I don't know about this thing-
The Court: Objection sustained to that: 
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Ernest Lynn. 
Mr. Moncure: Your Honor, Mr. Drinard is an agent of the 
city and I think what he would have to say as an agent of the 
city is admissible here. In that case I think he was acting 
as an adminisfrative official of the City of Richmond and 
,vhat he had to say is an admission on the part of the City of 
Richmond. 
The Court: How would- that have any bearing? 
Mr. Moncure: I am trying to show there was some doubt 
in the mind of the city officials as to what this meant. 
The Court: Is that material, that there was 
page 7 ~ doubt f 
Mr. Moncure: Yes, sir, if there is doubt in what 
the ordinance meant because the doubt should be resolved in 
favor of the taxp11yer. 
The Court: It is immaterial whether there is doubt on 
the part of the administrative officials or not. 
Mr. Moncure: Thev are the ones who administer this law 
and they are supposed to have special knowledg·e of it. 
Mr. McGuire: If the Court please, I will withdraw my ob-
jection to what Mr. Drinard said. 
The Court : All right. 
A. ( continued) So Mr. Drinard says: "I think you are 
wrong.'' So then Mr. Drinard began to read back for some 
several minutes and theu Mr. Wekh attempted to explain to 
Mr. Drinard what this law meant. So then Mr. Drinard said: 
''Well, I will have to let you know and I will give you my 
decision in a fe,v days.'' So that was the end of that con-
versation then. 
CROSS :BiXAl\IINATION. 
By Mr. McGuire : 
Q. Mr. Lynn, you gave many reasons why it was necessary 
to move vour used. car sales from No. 828 Hull to 
page 8 ~ No. 817. "' You did, in fact, move your used car 
business on January 20, 1951, from 828 to 817, did 
,you not? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. I understood you to say when Mr. :Moncure asked you 
when the matter of a new license was first taken up with you· 
-I nnderstood you to say that it was first taken up with you 
or first taken up by you in the spring of 1952 when the city 
sent you a bill for an atlditional license for the year 1951 at 
No. 8°17 f -
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A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Had you not been advised in January 1951 when you 
applied for a license at 828-weren't you then advised that 
you would have to have an additional license ·for the business 
conducted at 817? 
A. My bookkeeper handled that and they had all the 
licenses and everything; that is, I just left that up to them 
to pay the license. 
Q. You were aware, aren't you, that Lynn Pontiac, Inc., 
in January 1951 npplied for a used car flat license for the 
license year 1951 f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. At 817 Hull Street and paid the initial entry fee of $200; 
that is true, is it not! 
A. That is true, but it didn't sink into me at that 
page 9 ~ time that the city ·was trying to double tax me. 
After I paid the license once I never thought any-
more about it until they sent me another bill, so I was being 
double ta.xecl and that is when it came to my attention. 
Q. "\Veren 't you aware that you paid a" retail merchant's 
license tax at 828 in January 1951 based on the 1950 sales 
of both new and used cars at No. 828? 
A. vVell, I am not a tax man and I didn't go into it quite 
that thoroughly and that was probably the reason or maybe 
I would have ma<le objection then, but the law said it was 
$200 and I understood it was that and my bookkeeper brought 
me in the bill and said: "This is what it is supposed to be," 
and that is all I know about it and I just don't think anymore 
about it. 
Q. Have you any doubts about it I will prove this record 
later, but the records of the city show on January 29th, 1951, 
you paid on account of a license issued for your business con-
ducted and to be conducted until December 31, 1951, at 828 
Hull Street the sum of $2,927.49. Isn't that a substantial 
i:;um of money? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And you were aware that you had paid it, weren't you? 
A. Yes. That was to do business in the year 1951. 
Q. But you chose not to cond1ict your used car· 
page 10 ~ business for the year 1951 at that location; you 
· chose to move vour used car business to 817? 
A. But it was all one b1{siness, new cars and used cars. 
Q. You knew you were paying another license at 817, did 
you not?· 
A. Yes, to do business across the street. I didn't go far 
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enough into the law and am not enough lawyer for that and 
tax man to see the whole thing all the way through. 
Q. But you were aware of the facts? 
A. Yes, but I didu 't know it until they tried to assess me 
the second time. 
Q. You may not have understood the whole situation, you 
said you didn't, but you knew the facts in January 1951? 
A. No, I didn't know-
Q. You knew you had to pay the license and knew the 
amount? 
A. But I didn't know they were coming back and assess 
me a double tax to do business. That is the first I knew of it 
when they sent me another bill, an additional bill. 
Q. I think you said that you understood your lice:p.se tax 
that you paid in January 1951 for your license to do business 
at 828 Hull Street was based on the ne,,1 and used car sales 
during the previous year 1950 at that address? 
A. To do business in 1951. 
page 11 ~ Q. The bill that you got in 1952 for the additional 
tax on your 1951 license at 817 Hull Street-don't 
you know that was based on what the current sales for the 
year 1951 turned out to be? 
· A. Yes, but I didn't have any sales over there ; my sales 
were over at 828 Hull Street. 
Q. Your sales during 1951' were at 817? 
A That is correct. 
Witness stood aside. 
page 18 }-
C.H. l\IORRISSETT, 
called on behalf of the applicant, being first duly sworn, 
testified as follows : 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Moncure: 
Q. Will you state your name and occupation, please, sir? 
A. C. H. Morrisett; State Tax Commissioner. 
page 19 ~ Q. How long have you had that position Y 
A. Since April 1926. 
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Q. ,vhat is the nature of your position·¥ What do you do! 
A. I am the chief executive oflicer of the Department of 
Taxation. 
Mr. Moncure: Your Honor, I submit he is an expert wit-
ness; the Supreme Court of Virginia has so held. 
Mr. McGuire: I am glad to admit his qualifications. I ex-
pect to ask him in some more detail myself about what his 
duties a re for a specific purpose. 
By Mr. Moncure: 
Q. Have you been summoned by both sides, Mr. Mofrissett? 
A. Yes, sir, I have been summoned by both sides; I am a 
very popular witness. 
Q. Are you familiar with the State License situation for the 
year 1951 of Lynn Pontiac, Inc. f 
A. Yes, sir. . 
Q. I hand you a copy oi an ordinance No. 50-210-214 of the 
Richmond City Code of 1937 as a.mended to September 11, 
1952, and direct your attention to Section 10-122 of that code. 
· . Can you say from reading that section whether 
page 20 ~ you have a similar provision to administer in th~ 
State Code? 
A. "\Vell, there is in the Code of Virginia in the chapter 
on revenue licenses various provisions about persons begin-
ning business. There are persons who continue business after 
the close of a lieense year and there are those ,vho begin lmsi-
ness anew. The State license code does contain provisions 
with respect to persons beginning business. 
Q. I hand you a copy of the two photostats that have been 
introduced in evidence. They are on the reverse side of 
SS648 and SS649, Richmond ·city License Assessment, and 
on the reverse are the state assessments of Lynn Pontiac, Inc., 
SS648 shopping the assessment of Lynn Pontiac, Inc., on the 
basis of sales of $855,143 and showing a tax of $1,72l3.29 a.ncl 
a fee of 75 cents. 
A. That is correct. 
Q. Can you say whether or not Lynn Pontiac, Inc., has paid 
that tax! 
A. Yes. I will have to look at my own records, however. 
1\fr. McGuire: Excuse me. Are you sho,ving· him 828 Jl 
Mr. Moncure: Yes. 
A. (continued) Is that $1,726.29¥ 
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Q. That is correct, sir. 
A. Yes, sir, that has been paid. 
Q. Upon what was that license based? 
A. It was based upon the business of Lynn Pon-
pag-e 21 ~ tiac throug~10ut 1950. 
Q. I show you a copy of Richmond City License 
Assessment SS649 for the year 1951, Lynn Pontiac, Inc. On 
the back of it is the State of Virginia assessment showing a 
basis of $50,000 tax $116. 
A.. That was assessed and paid. 
Q. And what did that inclicate.as to the nature of the tax? 
What was the basis for that tnx at 817 Hull Street? 
A.. A.11 I know is according· to the record. It shows here: 
'' County or City in which application made: Ricl1mond. Defi-
nite place or house that business is to be conducted: 817 Hull 
Street. Applicant: Lynn Pontia~, Inc. Address: the same 
as above. Merchant who began business on or after January 
1, 1951:" and there it says: "Use cross. ;Basis: $50,000 pur-
chases. Tax: $116. Issuance- fee: 75 cents. Total: $116.75.'' 
That was paid to the Citf Treasurer on January 26, 1951. 
Q. Who makes these assessments for the State of Virginia Y 
A. The Commissioner of the Revenue of the City of Rich-
mond assesses state licenses. 
Q. This last license you have mentioned for 817 Hull Street 
does that indicate to yon that Lynn Pontiac, In-
page 22 ~ corporatecl, was being taxed as a beginner in busi-
ness at 817? 
A. ·without more it would indicate that. 
Q. I hand you a copy of Commonwealth of Virginia, Depart-
ment of Taxation, Notice of Assessment of License Tax for 
the year or years indicated below against Lynn Pontiac, Inc., 
817 Hull Street, Richmond, Virginia, dated March 17, 1952. 
Is that issued on a form that. your department uses? 
A. This is a notice of. assessment of license taxes for the 
year or years indicated below. It is dated March 17, 1952, 
headed Department of Taxation. Name of tax payer: Lynn 
Pontiac, Inc., 817 Hull Street, Richmond, Virginia. Tax year: 
1951. Additional license as a retail merchant. Basis of tax: 
$148,498.92 purchases. Tax assessed: $:297. Then it says: 
'' As per audit, City License Bureau.'' 
l\Ir. l\foncure: I would like to introduce this in evidence. 
(Filed and marked Exhibit No. 18.) 
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Q. Then the state takes the City License Bureau's audit 
and assesses the tax on that, is that correcU 
A. That is what was done. 
Q. ·was this matter discussed ,vith you at all by anyone 
from Lynn Pontiac, Inc.? . 
A. It was, in April, 1952. 
Q. As a result of that discussion did you request 
page 23 ~ a letter to be sent to you coucerninp; the matter? 
A. I did. 
Mr. McGuire: I suppose you are going· to ·offer this. I 
would like to see the reply. 
Mr. Moncure: There is no reply. 
Mr. McGuire: If the Court please, I am bound to object to 
the introduction of that letter. I suppose the chief objection 
is that it is a self-serving statement and it is pure argument 
addressed to the c·onscience of the State Tax Commissioner 
and I do not think it is admissible. He might ask Mr. Morris-
sett what action the State Tax Commissioner may have taken 
in regard to the state assessment on Lynn Pontiac at 817 Hull 
Street, but I do not think he can introduce this letter or ques-
tion him about it. I ask Your Honor to look at it. 
The Court: We don't have a jury. If I look at it, then I 
find out what it is and then I have to rule. So I might as well 
put it in and any part that is inadmissible the Court will not 
consider in determining the case. I am bound to either see 
it now for the purpose of passing on your objection or read 
it later on. 
Mr. McGuire: If' it is Your Honor's purpose .to admit it 
at this moment, I object and except for the reasons 
page 24 ~ just stated. 
The Court: All right. The Court will read it. 
(Reads letter.) So much of the letter as deals with facts is 
admissible; so much as deals with argument is not admissible. 
Mr. McGuire: I object to the admission of any of it for the 
reasons stated. 
The Court: Overruled. 
Mr. McGuire: Exception. 
(Filed and marked Exhibit No. 19.) 
By Mr. Moncure: 
·Q. Do you recognize this letter as one that was sent to you 
and received by you or copy of one sent to you Y 
A. Yes, sir, I recei vecl that. 
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Q. Will you read that letter to the Court 7 
The Court: I have read it. 
27 
Q. Mr. !Iorrissett, as a result of the facts set forth in this 
letter what action did vou taker· 
A. Favorable actio11 was taken on the presentation of the 
matter. Refund was made of $100 and abatement of an as-
sessment of an additional tax to the amount of $297 was 
ordered. 
Q. And they were carried out? 
A. They were carried out. 
page 25 } Q. Upon what basis did you base your decision 
and action in that case f 
A. The state law provides that a separate license must be 
acquired for each definite place of business. Here was a case 
in which new and used cars were sold at one location. The 
Virginia Retail Merchant's License Law makes no distinction 
between the sale of new cars and the sale of used cars. In-
deed, motor dealer retailers are simply classified as retail 
merchants by the state Iicens-e code. 
In this instance a very substantial and definite and ascer-
tainable part of the business of Lynn Pontiac was transferred 
from one location on this side of the street to another location 
on the other side. Now that constituted the establishment of 
a new location. It was a distinct place of business separate 
and apart from the place across the street. Therefore, the 
state required a separate state license, but inasmuch as this 
was a definite, ascertainable and very substantial part of the 
business of Lynn Pontiac which was transferred I regarded 
it a continuation of the used car business in a different loca-
tion as clistinguisbecl from what w.ould have happened if, let's 
say, they had established across the street in another busi-
ness, ,vc will say, for the sale of used cars in addition to what 
they bad. A separate license is required for each distinct 
place of business. 
page 26 ~ Q. And this should require a separate license-
A. A separate license was required. Now as to 
the basis of it, that seems to be the point. The final settlement 
of it with the State Tax authorities amounted to this, that I 
let the license for 1952 be measured by the used car sales in 
195L That was the net result. 
Q. This was a 1951 li.cense-
A. By 1950. . 
Q. You let the 1951 sales represent-
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A. The license for 1951 in the location across the street-I 
will say the tax on that was measured by the new car sales 
across the street in 1950. That is rig·ht; beg your pardon. 
Q. And by across the street you mean across the street at 
828 Hull Streett 
A. That is right. That is the used car place, 828, is it¥ 
Q. 828 is the new car place 1 
A. ·well, I think it is material to observe, if Your Honor 
please, why we have a state law dealing with one thing· and a 
city ordinance dealing with the same thing but in a different 
manner. Now, I am being asked questions about the state law 
and I am not expressing any opinion on the city ordinance at 
all. 
Q. I show you once again the ordinance No. 50-
page 27 ~ 210-214 of the Richmond City Code of 1937, as 
amended applicable December 26, 1950, as amended 
to September 11, 1952, and direct your attention to Section 
10.87 entitled ":rviotor Vehicle Dealers (used vehicles)". In 
the Code of Virginia have you any section at all comparable 
to tlia t section of the City Code 1 
A. No section in the state license code comparable to 10.87. 
Q. Then you are not called on at all to administer any such 
law as that? 
A. No, sir. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. McGuire: 
0 Q. Mr. Morrissctt, the state law, as I understand it, which 
is Section 58-245-that is the section, is it not, that you con-
strue as requiring a separate license for each separate place 
of business? 
A. Yes, sir. Tbat is Section 58-245 of the Code of Virginia. 
Q. That is the section that requires the separate license for 
each .scpara tc place of business 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Section 58-246, will you look at that, please, sir? 
A. Yes, sir. · 
Q. Tliat reads: ''When any person, firm or cor-
page 28 ~ poration is engag·ed in more than one business 
which is made by the provisions of this code sub-
ject to taxation, such person, firm or corporation shall pay the 
tax provided by law on each branch of the business.'' 
A. Yes, sir. 
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Q. You have stated that motor vel1icle dealers of all kinds · 
are taxed as ordinary retail merchants? 
A. That is correc( 
Q. That is, I believe, under Section 58-324? 
A. That is right. 
Q. They are not separately classifiecl 1 
A. No, sir. 
Q. A' motor vehicle dealer then who opens up a used car lot 
is not conducting a separate business from any other person 
within the general dictionary defi~ition of a retail mcrc]1anU 
A. No, that is right. 
Q. Had the State License Department classified the busi-
ness of a used car dealer as separate-I will state that another 
way. Had the State License Department classified the busi-
ness conducted by Lynn Pontiac, Inc., at the used car lot 817 
Hull Street as a different business, taxed at a different rate 
from a business conducted at 828 Hnll Sfrcct over the previ-
ous years, would you have concluded under those circum-
stances that the business at 817 wns a mere continuation of 
the business already being operated at s2s~1 
page 29 ~ Mr. Moncure: I object to the question, Your 
Honor. There is no such provision in the State 
Code as he bas suµ:gcstecl and the renson Mr. Morrissett is 
here today is to testify.because of the fact that he has had ex-
perience in administering the state law as it is written and be 
can testify only to what his administrative procedures are and 
administrative interpret~tions are. . 
The Court: I think he is qualified to testify to any hypo-
thetical question pnt to him. You may answer. 
:Mr. I\foncure: Exception. 
The Court: . Are you familiar with the CJUestion f 
The ·witness: Yes, Your Honor. 
A. The question was based upon a statute, the exact word-. 
ing of which was not stated and i11 that way ~ should be re-
luctant to express an opinion on something- other than the full 
language of the applicable statute. I believe the answer to the 
queRtion would depend upon the actual reading of the statute 
as a whole. It would not he ,vritten in as fow words as counsel 
has spoken. 
Q. :Mr. Morrissett, at the beginning of your answer to 1\fr. 
Moncure I understood you to start out your reasons by say-
ing that all the different kinds of motor vehicle businesses 
were not separated t 
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· page 30 ~ A. That is right. 
Q. In the state license law, but were included 
under the general retail merchants' license! · 
A. Yes. 
Q. What I asked vou was merely that if a new business that 
opened up at 817 H11ll Street was a business which, according 
to the state license law, fell into a different classification, dif-
ferently taxed from the business which they bad previously 
conducted at 828, would your conclusion have been the same 
in view of the Section 48-246 which requires a separate license 
for each separate business, ·even thoug·b conducted by the same 
business entity? 
A. If the company had been doing a used car business on 
one side of Hull Street mid bad done 110 used car-a new car 
business on one side of Hull Street and had done no used car 
business at all, but had subsequently opened the used car place 
across the street, naturally that would be a new business in 
every sense of the word. · · 
Q. vVell, if Lynn Pontiac bad conducted a new and used car 
business the previous year at 828 and such a business fell into 
one tax classification under the State License Chapter and if 
they opened up a new used car business-used car sales only 
at 817 Hull Street across the street and that used car business 
fell into a separate classification, separately taxed under the 
State License Chapter from the combined business 
page 31 ~ they bad formerly conducted, wouldn't you reach 
the same result that was a new business? 
Mr. Moncure: I object to that question also. Mr. McGuire 
is asking· the witness to testify as to and interpret the city 
code and that is the very thing His Honor is to interpret to-
day, as to what the city code says. 
The Court: As· I understand the previous answer of the 
witness, before 110 wanted to give an opinion one way or the 
other be wanted to read the statute or tbe city ordinance. 
Mr. McGuire: I lrnve tried to avoid asking Mr. Morrissett 
to construe t11e city ordinance. Actually under the Richmond 
Food Stores case what they did in that case was to hold that 
certain letters written by Mr. Morrissett were not admissible 
in evidence because immaterial to the ·controversy of the city 
ordinance. The questions I was going to ask Mr. Morrissett 
w~en I summoned him are material to this controversy, as I 
tbmk I can show. Never the less tl1e Supreme Court said: 
"We agree with the lower court that Mr. l\forrissett's letters 
are not admissible in evidence, but we also agree with the 
City of Richmond v. Lynn Pontiac, Inc. 
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lower court that they may be ·used in argument as 
page 32 } he is a recog11ized expert by this ·court as a dis-
tinguished expert on taxation.'' 
I would like to show him the city ordinance and ask him 
that question for the purpose of using it in argument. I don't 
know that it is admissible for him to construe the city ordi-
nance. 
. The Court: No, and tl1at is wlmt he said a moment ago, but 
be said as an expert in order to express an expert opinion he 
would want the question put to him with the terms of the ordi-
nance outlined in detail and not summarized in the brief fash-
ion counsel summarized it in the question. So without asking 
him to construe the ordinances of the City of Richmond it 
seems to me you can put a hypothetical question· to him and 
as a basis of the hypothesis can use the terms contained in the 
ordinances of the City of Richmond. 
Mr. McGuire: That is what I meant to propose. 
Q. ].\fr. ].\forrissett, I call your atte1ttion to Section 10-87 of 
the ordinance No. 50-210-214 of the City of Richmond relating 
to taxation, adopted December 26, 1950, which is the ordinance 
as far as the relevant sections are concerned that was in force 
in 1951 and '52 and is still in force. This Section 10A87 has 
the catchline, as you see: ~'Motor Vehicle Dealers.-(U sed 
Vehicles)". That ordinance contains at the be-
page 33 } ginning three categ·ories of persons upon which it 
purports to levy license taxes. Would you read 
those three categories, the paragraphs marked· (a), (b) and 
(c) 1 
A. "Section 10-87. Motor Vehicle Dealers.-(Used Ve-
hicles.) 
'' (a) Every motor vehicle dealer engaged in the business 
of selling· or offering for sale new motor vehicles and who 
sells or offers for sale used motor vehicles taken in trade In 
the sale of such new vehicles at a place of business other than 
the place of business where such new vehicles are sold or of-
fered fo~ sale shall pay a license tax equal to $200 and .34 of 
1 % of the gross receipts of the business in excess of $52,941. 
'' (b) Every motor vehicle dealer engaged in the business 
of selling or offering for sale used or second-hand motor ve-
hicles to others at retail only and not for re-sale exclusively 
and does not engage in the business of selling or offering for 
sale new motor vehicles shall pay a license tax equal to $200 
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and .34 of 1 % of the gross receipts of the business in excess 
of $52,941. 
'' ( c) Every motor vehicle dealer engaged in the business 
of selling or offering for sale new and used motor vehicles or 
both at the same place of business, whether taken in trade or 
purchased for re-sale, shall pay a license tax of $20 and .34 of 
1 % of the g-ross ·receipt of said business." 
page 34 ~ Q. Now do you see in any of tliose three cate-
gories a tax leYied upon persons engaged in sell-
ing new motor vehicles only who do not sell used motor ve-
hicles at all ! 
A. The first s·ection relates to motor vehicle dealers selling 
new cars and who sold used cars at anotl1er place. (b) Re-
lates to the sale of second-hand or used and does not apply in 
anyway to new. Paragraph (c) 1--elates to a dealer selling 
both new and used at the same place. 
Q. Then your answer, I assume, is that this section does 
not purport to tax people wJ.10 sell new vehicles only ·r 
Mr. Moncure: Your Honor, he stated his opinion. 
Mr. lVfcGuire: He hasn ''t answered the question. 
Mr. Moncure: But he has stated his opinion and you are 
asking him to change his opinion. 
l\fr. l\foGuire: I asked him if he saw in tllere any tax levied 
upon people who sell new cars only and do not sell used cars 
at all. 
l\fr. Moncure: He answered by saying (a) covered new and 
used at a different place of business, that (b) were those who 
sold used only and ( c) who sold new and-used at the snme place 
of business. 
By tho Court : . 
Q. Mr. Morrissett, in your opinion did any of those three 
cover the taxation on the sale of new vehicles either 
page 35 ~ exclusively or in any otlJer way 1 
A. Parag·raph ( c) says any motor vehicle dealer 
engaged in the business of selling; or offering for sale new and 
used motor vehicles or both at the same place of business. I 
assume that is intended to apply to tl1e one who sells new ve-
hicles but does not sell any. used. 
By Mr. McGuire: 
Q. Mr. l\forrissett, would you say that paragraph (a) and 
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paragraph ( c) were separate classifications or applied to the 
snme people 1 
Mr. l\Ioncure: Your Honor, I think this entire line of ques-
tioning goes rigl11: against the very rule by which we permit 
1'fr. Morrissett to testify in the case. It was in the Richmond 
Food Stores case the court said this: 
"It is true that the rule of interpretation which permits the, 
courts to look to the practical construction adopted by execu-
tive officers is usually applied to cases in which such construc-
tion has continued and bcei1 acquiesced in for a long period 
of time; but it is not to be confined to such cases. One reason 
for the rule is that the officers charged with the duty of carry-
ing new laws into effect are presumed to have familiarized 
themselves with all the considerations pertinent to 
page 36 ~ tbe meaning aud purpose of the ·new law, and to 
have formed an independent, conscientious and 
competent expert opinion thereon." 
Mr. l\forrissett has never been called upon to administer 
that law and I think it is unfair to ask Lim to say what that 
law means. 
Mr. :McGuire: I am not asking Mr. 1\forrissett to give an 
administrative construction of that city ordinance; I am ask-
ing him as an expert if he thinks pAragraphs (a) and (c) of 
10-87 set up two separate clnssifications. 
The Court: I coulcln 't hear you. 
Mr. McGuire: I wasn't asking what ,vas the proper con-
struction of the city ordinance; I was a8king him as a tax ex-
pert if in reading 10-87 he considered paragraphs (a), (b) and 
( c) of that section com posed two sepa ra tc classifications. 
The Court: I think l1e can answer tlmt. I think it is proper 
to ask the question if J\.fr. J\forrissett believes his tax experi-
ence would justify him in expressing an opinion as to whether 
those two paragraphs purport to tax two different places of 
business. 1 think he can answer the question. Objection over-
ruled. 
l\fr. l\Ionc.ure: Exception. 
A. It appears to me tbat paragraph (a) creates 
page 37 ~ a classification of a used car dealer where he sells 
the used cars at a place separate and distinct from 
the place where new cars are sold. It appears that paragraph 
( c) covers the case where n motor vehicl~ dealer sells both 
used and new cars at the same place or merely new cars. 
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Q. May I ask you 011e more question about that? Are the 
tax rates provided by (a) and ( c) the same or different? 
A. The tax rates a re different, higher under the first para-
graph. 
Q. Mr. Morrissett, I will ask you please to look at Section 
10-124 of the city ordinance which is headed: ''Designation 
of Place of Business.'' "'\Vould you be good enough to look at 
that and tell me if that is substantially the same provision as 
Section 58-2451 
A. Substantially the same. The state tax authorities have 
always construed and applied Section 58-245 of the Code of 
Virginia as meaning- that a separate state license is required 
for each distinct place of business of every retail merchant. 
Q. Mr. l\forrissctt, may I ask you if the present Section 58-
245 is a part of tlrn old Section 188 of the old tax code? 
A. Section 58-245 of the code of 1950 came from Section 
] 31 of the tax code of 1928. The Code Commission converted 
Section 188 of the old tax code into Articles 6 and 7 and 8 of 
Chapter 7. 
page 38 r Q. I made a mistake. I said 188; I meant to say 
131. 
A. Yes, that is correct. 
Mr. McGuire: '17 e lmve no further questions, but I have 
three copies· of letters of Mr. Morrissett which I would like to 
introduce as illustrative of his practical construction over a 
period of time of Section 58-245. 
Q. Mr. Morrissett, I have in my hand three letters which 
purport to be carbon copies of a letter elated May 25, 1949, ad-
dressed by you to Mr. Georg·e M. Cochran, City Attorney, 
Staunton, Virginia; a letter of January 12, 1949, addressed to 
Mr. J. T. L. Dickinson, Jr., T. T. Dickinson & Brothers, Buena 
Vista ; and a letter of September 19, 1952, addressed to Mr. 
C. B. Wiltshire, Commissioner of Revenue, Lynchburg, Vir-
ginia. 
I believe that under Section 58-33 of the Code of Virginia 
you are charged with supervision of the Commissioners of 
Revenue and general administration of the tax laws of the 
state. I simply want fo ask you if these are the corti.es of let-
ters written by vou to these gentlemen in the exercise of your 
duties as State Tax Commissioner and in a practical construc-
tion of 58-245 of the present code? 
A. These letters nre duplicate or triplicate originals to these 
gentlemen. 
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(Filed and marked Exhibits Nos. 20, 21, 22.) 
pag·e 39} Mr. Moncure: i would like to point out to the 
Court we haven't in our testimony we have ad-
duced from Mr. Morrissett in anyway contended we do not 
l1ave to pay separate licenses for each separate place of busi-
ness under the state law. 
Mr. McGuire: If the Court please, the application for cor-
rection of the taxation I construe as so contending. 
Mr. Moncure: No, we have made no contention under the 
state law. 
Mr. McGuire: Beg your pardon. I misunderstood. 
RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Moncure: 
Q. Are you familiar with 58-245, licenses to separate desig-
nated places of business? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Is there a saving provision in there which reads: '' Every 
license gTanting authority to engage in or exercise any busi-
ness, employment or profession, unless expressly authorized 
elsewhere or otherwise, shall designate the place of such busi-
ness.'' 
A. That is correct. 
Q. In my conferences with you and Mr. Lynn's conferences 
with you and in the action taken by you were separate licenses 
required by yon for both 828 and 817 Hull in 19511 
A. Yes. 
Q. But your practical construction then and the 
page 40 } administrative construction you had, the difference 
between that and the city was that yon held that 
Lynn Pontiac, Inc., at 817 Hull in 1951 was not beginning a 
business Y 
A. Not in the full and true sense of the word. We looked on 
it as a removal of a substantial, definite, ascertainable part of 
an old hus.iness. If the ·whole bnsin:ess l1ad been removed,, 
surely that company would not have been a beginner in the new 
location. The state tax law provides for the transfer of a li-
cense from one location to another in the same county or city, 
but not from one county or city to another county or city. I 
should like to make it clear that the view was that a new lo-
cation was established and the only question was as to what -
should be the basis for measuring the license tax. There was 
never any question about the fact that a new, definite place 
of business was established. 
Q. The provision to which you have just referred to as to 
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removing a license from one place to another within the same 
county or city is that similar to Section 127-e of an ordinance 
number 50-210-214, adopted December 26, 1950, which I show 
to you f · 
A. Yes, that is very much in the same language, I believe, 
of Section 58-258 of the Code of Virginia. . 
Q. But the effect of your ruling in abating the 
page 41 ~ $297 of additional assessment and authorizing to 
pay a $100 refund was that Lynn was not beginning 
a business! 
A. Not in the full and true sense of the word. They were 
beginning in the sense of establishing a new location. The 
measurement of the tax, however, was the business done at 
the other location for the preceding year. 
RE-CROSS EXAMINATION. 
Bv Mr. McGuire: 
"'Q. l\fr. Morrissett, I understand that you mean when you 
say that they were not beginning a. business in the fnll and 
true sense of the word you mean under the state law1 
A. That is right, under the state law. 
Q. Isn't all that based on the fact the state law does not 
classify the business which was moved separately from tlle 
original business f 
A. The state law is substantially different from the city 
ordinances. 
·witness stood aside . 
• 
page 42 ~ 
• 
E. GLENN JOHDAN, 
called on behalf of the applicant, being first duly sworn, t.PHfi-
fied as follows: 
Mr. Moncure: I would like to examine Mr. E. Glenn Jordan 
aR an adverse witness. I summoned him because of the statu-
tory requirement that he be present and questioned touching 
the application. 
Mr. McGuire: If Your Honor please, I don't think he can 
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examine Mr. Jordan as an adverse witness. Mr. 
page 43 ~ Jordan is 1iot an officer of the citv. He is a Com-
. missioner of the Revenue of the city hut is a state 
officer and charged with making assessments of both state and 
city taxes under the statutes of the state and I don't think 
- he is entitled to examine him as an adverse witness. He sum-
moned him as part of his case. 
The Court : \Yell, he can question him-
1\Ir. McGuire: I would ratl1er he not lead him. 
The Court: If he tums out to be adverse, he can cross ex-
amine him. . 
By Mr. Moncure: 
Q. "\Vould you state your name and occupation? 
A. E. Glenn Jordan, Commissioner of the Revenue for the 
City of ~ichmond. 
Q. Are you acquainted with the application for correction 
of erroneous assessment and refund filed bv Lynn Pontiac in 
this caset .. 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. By what chapter of the City Code are licenses assessed 
in Richmond f 
A. Under Chapter 10, a section of the new code; 10.86 in 
this case. · 
Q. 10.861 
page 44 ~ A. 10.87 in this I believe. but I have the new code. 
The languag·e I understaiid is the same. 
Q. Do you make the assessment in this case personally? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. ·who makes them 1 
A. Our deputies make them under my . supervision, of 
course. 
Q. Are they your agents in making them? 
A. Yes, sir, and the nclclit.ional aRsessments come to us from 
the license inspector, l\fr. Welch's office, and my deputies make 
the assessment on his audits and recommendations. 
Q. Of what is the License Bureau of the City of Richmond 
composed? What is its function and what does it do f 
A. Their duties and functions are to make audits of all · 
business and professional licensees in the city perioclically ·and 
to see whether the license tax paid was ::mfficient to take care 
of the business that was actni1lly done durin<?; the taxable year 
and if the license paid waR not sufficient, they make an addi-
tional assessment; if they find the tax paid was in excess then 
a refund is made. 
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Q. Who in your office actually handled this transaction? 
Is there some one person who had ch~nge of this work concern-
ing Lynn Pontiac? 
A. This assessment was made in the South Richmond office 
and Mr. ·w orsham has charge of the office in this 
page 45 ~ building-the original assessment itself. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
B,; Mr. McGuire: 
WQ. Mr. Jordan, I take it that you make or Mr. Worsham or 
lJis assistants over here make for vou this initial assessment 
on the basis of the questionnaires filed by the tax payers and 
licensees in ,January of·each year, is that correcU 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And all additional assessments made by you, whether 
because an original estimate is found to be incorrect or an 
original report or questionnaire is found to be incorrect, are 
made on the basis of audits furnished you by the License 
Bureau? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. You make assessments under the state ]icense tax laws 
as well as under the city license chapter, do you noU 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. In the state license law, is there any separate classi-
fication of motor vehicle dea'Jers from other retail merchants? 
A. No, sir, there is not ; they are taxed as retail merchants. 
Q. ·what about the city ordinance? Is there a 
page 46 ~ separate elassification there Y 
. A. A separate classification for the used· car 
dealers. · 
Q. They are taxed under 10-87? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. And how are the people, if any there are-there are I 
suppose-people who sell new cars only and do not sell used. 
cars at all, under what section of the city license code do you 
assess them? 
A. Under the retail merchants' section. 
Q. Is that number 10-84? 
A. That is right. 
RE-DIRECT EXA1\1INATI0N. 
Rv Mr. Moncure: . 
· Q. Mr. Jordan, are the state and city license question-
naires-when a person is making an application for state and 
city license· on what forms do they make the application? 
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A. ,v e have a regular form questionnaire as to the gross 
1·ec~ipts of the business, and if it is a new business beginning 
durmg the taxable year, they are requested to file an estimate. 
Q. When these applications are filed do you ever refuse to 
accept them 1 When they would be filled out and drawn up by 
the company filing it do you refuse to accept them 
page 4 7 ~ at anytime 1 
A. The figures they submit, you mean f 
Q. Yes. 
A. I don't recall refusing any because they are subject to 
audit and they are audited periodically by the License In-
spector's Office and if they are not found correct they would 
be corrected. 
Q. What is the procedure when the questionnaire is brought 
in on your form and handed in-take the year -1951 or '52 for 
Lynn Pontiac-and would show only one figure showing its 
total receipts and not breaking it down into new and used Y 
What would your office do Y 
A. Not broken down in new or used 1 
Q. Just the gross receipts figure. 
A. If he had a n,ew lmsiness only, that would he taxed 
under the retail merchants' section and should be so stated on 
the questionnaire. Now for the used car dealer, of course, 
there is a minimum of $200 which takes care of a maximum 
of $52,945. of gross sales and all in excess of that is taxed at 
34 cents a hundred. 
Q. Wasn't that form issued when it provided space only for. 
retail merchants and wholesale merchants¥ 
A. It is a place on there for used cars dealers. 
Q. I fail to see it. 
A. On the back. 
page 48 ~ Q. No, I fail to see it. Vlould you like to see the 
application 1 
The Court: The easiest wav to do that is hand it to him and 
ask him to show it to you. " 
Bv Mr. Moncure: 
0 Q. Can you point out on that form whether there is a provi-
sion for the classification used car dealers or used car lots 
or used car sales? 
Mr. McGuire: May I a~k wl1iel1 exhibit you are showing 
himY 
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Mr. Moncure: This is the 1952 state and city license ques-
tionnaire for 828 Hull Street. 
A. No, sir, it doesn't show on here any difference between 
new cars and used cars. It sl10ws on there the total amount of 
the gross receipts. It does show whether it is a new business 
or an old business. 
Q. But is all just under retail merchants, isn.'t that right; 
doesn't break it down at alH 
A. That is right. 
RE-CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. :McG.uire: 
Q. Mr. Moncure has just shown you the 1952 questionnaire 
:filed by Lynn Pontiac, Inc., wit11 relation to 828 Hull Street and 
you have stated there was on. that questionnaire 
page {9 ~ nothing about used car dealers, but it only refers 
to retail merchants. I hand you now the 1952 ques-
tionnaire :filed by Lynn Pontiac, Inc. with relation to these 
premises at 817 Hull Street and ask you if you see anything 
on the questionnaire about used car lot f 
A. I do, yes, sir. 
Q. vVhere do yon see it? 
A. It says: '' State nature of business or profession'', and it 
savs: ''Used car lot.'' Q. I hand you the 1952 questionnaire in relation to 1428 
Hull Street and ask you if yon see on that anything about 
used car dealer1 
A. I do. It says: "State nature of business or profession'' 
and it says: "Used car dealer." 
·witness stood aside. 
EARL vV. SOv\TERS, 
called on behalf of the applicant, being :first duly sworn, testi-
fied as follows : 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Moncure: 
. Q. ·wm you state your name and occupation? 
A. Earl vV. Sowers; I am accountant for Lynn 
page 50 ~ Pontiac, Inc. 
· Q. How long have you been accountant for Lyun 
Pontiaci 
A. Since August 1951. 
Q~ Then you were charged with the .responsibility of ftling 
for the license for Lynn Pontiac back in 1952 ¥ 
A. That is true. 
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9. Mr. Sowers, I hand you a state and city license question-
naire for 1952 which is for Lynn Pontiac, Inc., 828 Hull Street, 
Richmond, Virginia, showing the gross receipts for the period 
January 1, 1951 to December 31, 1951, amounting to $761,-
109.99. Do you recognize that questionnaire? 
A. Yes, I do. 
Q. Did you complete that questionnaire vourself? 
A. Yes, I did. · 
Q. What did you do with it after you bad completed it? 
A. I took it to the Commissioner of Revenue's office, 
Hustings Court, Part II, here and submitted it for my license 
for the vear. 
Q. Wl;at did he say about iU "\Vould he accept itf 
A. "\Vell, actually he didn't accept it on the face of it. He 
on his own initiative took another copy of this and made out 
a separate return on the used car department. 
page 51 ~ :Mr. :Moncure : I would like to file this in evidence. 
(Filed and marked Exhibit ~o. 2:3) 
Q. I show ?OU a copy of the 1952 stute and city license ques-
tionnaire, City of Richmond, Lynn Pontiac, Inc., 828 Hull 
Street, fully completed, which is in evidence and. ask you if 
that is the breakdown that was made bv the office of the Li-
cense Bureau in 1952 after the refusal of this application you 
made¥ 
A. Yes, it is. 
Q. I hand you the 1952 state and city license questionnaire, 
City of Richmond, Lynn Pontiac, Inc., 817 Hull Street, used 
car lot ·as the nature of business or profession. Is that the 
questionnaire that was made by the-is this the copy of the 
application that was made by the License Bureau of the City 
of Richmond at that time f 
A. Yes, it is. 
Q. Is your ,vriting anywhere on ltere except the signature 1 
A. No, it is- not. 
Q. Then the only thing you have written on here is your 
sfa·nature? 
'A. That is correct. 
Q. And they were prepared by the License Bureau of the 
City of Richmond? 
A. That is rorrect. 
page 52 ~ Q. I hand you the 1952 state and city license ques-
tionnaire for ] 428 Hull Street, used car dealer. Do 
yon recognize that as having been issued to you? 
A. Yes, I do. 
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Q. Is your handwriting on here any:where other than the 
sirnature Y · 
A. No, it is not. 
Q. \Vho completed that form 1 
A. One of the clerks in the Commissioner of the Revenue's 
office here in Hustiugs Court, Part II. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. McGuire: 
Q. What your testimony amounts to, I gather, is that you 
.submitted or intended to submit, although it is not sig·ned, a 
questionnaire for license to be issued for the business done 
at 828 Hull Street to he computed on the basis of gross re-
ceipts during 1951 in tho amount of $761,109.99 f 
A. That is correct. 
Q. What did that figure include f Did that figure include the 
sales at 828 Hull Street in 1951 and also the sales in 1951 at 
817 Hull Street? 
A. That included the gross sales of our business for that 
vear. 
~ Q. You haven't answered my question. 
page 53 ~ The Court : Answer the question. 
Q. Now I will ask you again: Does that figure $761,109.99 
include the sales of new cars made at 828 Hull Street and also 
the sales of used cars made at 817 Hull Street during the year 
19511 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. ·what the Commissioner of the Revenue's office did then 
was require you to apply for one license for 828 Hull Street, 
another license for 817 Hull Street and still another license 
based on an estim1.te for 1428 Hull Street, which you had 
opened up on February 19, 1952, is that correct? 
A. That is correct. 
• 
page 54 ~ D. ANDRE\V ·wELCH, 
called on behalf of the City of Richmond, being first 
duly sworn, testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. McGuire: 
Q. Would you please state your name, age and present 
occupation Y 
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A. D. A.ndrnw Welch; fifty, License Inspector, City of Rich-
mond. 
_Q. How long have you been License Inspector of the·City of 
Richmond! · 
A. Thirteen years, since February l, 1940. 
Q. What was your business experience prior to 1940 f 
A. It was in the wholesale g·rocery business for fifteen years 
and the wholesale automotive business for five years. 
Q. Were you ever a member of the old Common Council or 
the Board of Aldermen of the Citv of Richmond? 
.A. Yes, sir, I served on the Council for a period of approxi-
mately four years. 
Q. Were you ever a member of any council committee which 
was appointed to consider the matter of license taxes Y 
A. I served on the Joint Committee of Licenses for several 
terrris. 
Q. Can you describe generally your duties as Li-
page 55 } cense Inspector of the City of Richmond? 
A. To require compliance with the License 
Chapter 10 to the extent of seeing all people are licensed, arc 
licensed properly and that they pay the amount of license 
due the City of Richmond. 
Q. When you became License Inspector I take it you were 
concern~d-when yon first became License Inspector what 
license law was then in force¥ 
A. The license ordinance in effect then was the revision 
made in 1937, which had not been amended substantially upon 
the conclusion of the revision of that date. 
Q. That is Chapter 10 of the Rirhmond City Code of 1937? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. I show you Section 122 of Chapter l O of that code, which 
has the headline '':Merchants Retail'' and ask you the basis 
of the tax on retail merchants imposed by that section? 
.A... Well, I ~ssume you mean the rate that was in effect at 
the time of the ordinance? 
Q. Yes. · 
A. The rate then was $20 fee which included $2,000 of sales 
and 17 cents per 100 on additional sales over and above that 
figure which applied to all retail merchants assessable under 
the license ordinance. 
Q. ·What do you mean by sales? 
page 56 ~ A. Well, at that time the word "Sales" meant 
ag-reement on price between the buyers and sellers 
made at retail. 
Q. I mean what sales? ·what volume of sales was used as 
a measure of tax Y 
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A. The total volume of sales as made bv the retail merchant 
during the immediate preceding year of l{is license experience 
-calendar year. 
Q. Will y·ou look at Section 54,which is headed'' Automobile 
Dealers". At that time were all automobile dealers taxed 
under that Section 54f 
A. At that time the Section 54 applied to those who sold 
automobiles and motor vehicles, new and used. 
Q. ,vrn you state how the various classes were ta."(ed 7 
A. Well, (b) the business of selling new automobiles set at a 
rate of $20 for the initial $2000 and 17 cents per 100 above that 
figure on the volume of business enjoyed the immediate pre-
ceding year. 
Q. By volume of business you mean sales 'l 
A. Sales made during the preceding year. Then in (c) of 
the same section every automobile dealer engaged in the busi-
ness of selling new vehicles at a place of business other than 
the place of business where such new antomohileR 
page 57 ~ are sold or offered for sale,.for the first surh place 
of business a $25 license was levied and for each 
additional place of business a $50 license w~s required. 
By the Court : 
Q. That also contemplates one who sells or offers used 
vehicles, too, doesn't iU 
A. That is in ( d), includes one who shall engage in the busi-
ness of offering for sale second-hand vehicles and his license 
tax was a flat $100. 
Q. That is ( d), but ( c) covers also automobile dealers who 
· sell or offer used cars. 
A. Every automobile dealer engaged in the business of 
selling or offering for sale new automobiles, who sells or 
offers for sale used au'tomobiles at a place of business other 
than the place of business where such new vehicles are sold 
or offered for sale. 
Bv Mr. McGuire: 
·Q. But the people taxed under (c) and (d) are not under 
that ordinance taxed with relation to sales t 
A. No, it was a flat rate tax. For the new• car dealers who 
opened up a lot for used cars the license fee was $25 for the 
first lot and $50 for each additional lot. 
Q. And (d) 7 
A. ( d) vVould be a used car dealer exclusively and the flnt 
rate of $100 applied to him. 
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Q. Do you know whether on or about January 7, 
page 58 ~ 1947, the City Council created a commission to 
study the :financial needs of the city and the 
methods of assessing· taxes Ji 
A. In December 1946, the City Council saw fit to double the 
rates prevailing in the license code .at that time, to become 
effective January 1, 1947, with the understanding- that a 
committee would be named to stuclv sources of revenue with 
particular reference to the license code. 
:Mr. McGuire: I should like to offer in evidence a joint 
resolution approved January 11, 1947, creating a commission 
to study the financial condition of the City of Richmond and 
the sources and methods of assessing· taxes and to make recom-
mendations with respect to a definite tax policy to be followed 
and to report its recommendations to the Council and the 
Mayor. This resolution purports to create a commission of 
fifteen members, two of whom shall be member's of the Board 
of Aldermen, to be appointed by the President of that body, 
three to be members of the Common Council, to be appointed 
by the President of that body, and ten to be citizens of the 
City of Richmond in no ,vay connected with the City govern-
ment, to be appointed by the l\fayor. 
The second paragraph sets the duty of the commission to 
study the finaucinl condition of the city and the 
page· 59 ~ sources and methods of assessing taxes and to make 
recommendations with respect to a defin,ite tax 
policy to be followed and to report its recommendations to 
the Council and t.he mayor on· or lwfore August 1, 1947, so as 
to allow time for appropriate legislaticn to be .considered 
and acted upon by the Council prior to .T anuary 1, 1948 to 
become effective on that date. 
(Filed and marked Exhibit No. 24) 
Q. Thir. vVelch, do you know whether the members of that 
commission were appointed by the preGicling officers of the 
two houses of the then Council and by tl1e mayor f 
A. Yes, they were appointed and included in that study was 
a partirular review of the lieemdng- structure of the city 
and I served with them and consultc,cl with the members of 
the commission during its life. 
Q. Did you serve and consult with them with particular 
reference to the license taxes 1 
A. ·with particular ref eronce to license taxes. 
Q. Now I ask you if the Council thereafter on or about 
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December 23, 1947, enacted a general revision of Chapter 10 
of the Richmond City Cotle, 1937, to take effect in 19481 
.A. After a comprehensive study and public hearings a new 
code was-new chapter rather, was recommen<led 
page 60 }- by the tax study commission and the Council did 
enact it on :Qecember 23, 1947 and it was finally 
approved by the Board of Aldermen and took effect January 
1, 1948. 
Q. Is this ordinance which is in evidence marked Exhibit 
16 the ordinance to which you refer? 
.A. This is the ordinance which was effective with the calen-
dar year 1948. 
Q. I will ask you to turn to the section of that ordinance 
numbered 10.258 and bearing the catchline "Motor Vehicle 
Dealers.'' I will ask you to look at the paragraphs (b) and 
( c) of that ordinance and state what classes of business are 
covered in those paragraphs and what the tax imposed is? 
A. Paragraph (b) reads:· "Every motor vehicle dealer en-
gaged in the business of selling or offering for sale new motor 
vehicles, and who sells or offers for sale used motor vehicles 
taken in trade in the sale of such new vehicles, at a place of 
business other than the place of business where such new 
vehicles are sold or offered for sale, shall pay a· license tax 
equal to $200 and .34 of 1 % of the gross receipts of the busi-
. ness in excess of $52,941.'' 
( c) is: "Every motor vehicle dealer engaged in the busi-
ness of selling or offering for sale used or second-hand motor 
vehicles to others at retail onlv and not for re-·sale exclu-
sively, and does not e'ngage in the business of ~cll-
page 61 ~ ing or offering for sale new· motor vehicle~,· shall 
pay a license tax equal to $200 and .34 of 1 % of the 
gross receipts of the business in excess of $52,941." 
Q. Now under what provision of these ordinances were 
other motor vehicle dealers who sold new cars only-I will 
put it this way: Were any motor vehicle dealers taxed when 
this ordinance was in effect under any other section of· the 
ordinances! 
A. Would you mind clearing that question or having it 
read back? 
Q. This ordinance was in effect during 1948 and 1949? 
A. That is correct. . 
Q.- Is there any other section of this ordinance under which 
some motor vehicle dealers were taxed? 
A. It is conceivable that one engaged in selling motor 
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vehicles exclusively of trade-ins or used cars would be as-
sessed as a retail merchant. 
Q. Is that under Section 10.2541 · 
A. That is correct. At that time, if I recall, it was difficult 
to get new cars. Some of the dealers were trading in used 
cars to a very extensive degree. 
Q. This 10.258 seems considerably different from 54 of the 
old code that I showed you. Can you tell me the reason for 
those changes? 
A.. The reason for the changes was, along with 
page 62 } various other sections in the license code, to get 
away from the flat rate license since that was re-
garded as regressive taxation, and placed all taxes that could 
possibly be done so on a gross receipts bash;. The $200.00 
would be manifestly wrong if the small dealer had to pay 
it and one doing ten or fifteen times as much volume had the 
same tax. So. the tax was changed; and also because a new 
dealer could move a Yery substantial Yolume of business to 
another place and operate on a flat tax of $50.00 or $100.00, 
depending upon whether or not it was a first or second lot. 
Q. Is that substantially the reason for this change in the 
law? · 
A. And in addition to that, it prevented difficulty in audit-
ing procedure where deductions were made from the place of 
business and the sales were computed at another and at 
· location B the sales would not be divided since the tax would 
be a flat rate one~ That took place in many places in the 
license code. 
Q. This section (b) of 10-258, is that intended to tax the 
new vehicles sold by that motor vehicle dealer or the used 
vehicles? 
Mr. l\Ioncure: I object to the question as asking for a judi-
cial interpreta.tion of that sectiori (b). 
Mr. McGuire: He has given his experience if 
page 63 ~ the Court please, as License Inspector, member of 
the Council Committee on licenses, and a gentle-
man who collaborated with the special tax study commission 
to prepare this ordinance and I can certainly ask him what it 
intended- to tax. 
The Court: y OU can if there is anything doubtful about 
the language. 
l\fr. McGuire: Mr. l\Ioncure seems to think it means some-
thing that I do not think it means. Mr. Moncure thinks that 
section is intended to tax this dealer-it is identical actually 
with (a) of 10.87 in the present ordinance. I just had to 
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bring tllis one up because it is the first time it was. put in the 
law-it is identical with 10.87 (a) and Mr. Moncure 's con-
tention is that section is intended to impos_e the tax on the 
new cars only is taxed under 10.84, but it is clearer in the cur-
The City's position is that it is intended to tax, and has 
been construed to tax by the administrative officers, only the 
used car business of these men and that the person that sells 
new car only is taxed under 10.84, hut it is clearer in the cur-
rent ordinance than in this one, for one thing because of the 
catchline "Used cars", but it was nobody's idea to tax any-
thing but used cars under this 10.258 or the present 
page 64 ~ 10.87. 
The Court: It has been in effect four license years Y 
Mr. :.McGuire: Yes. 
The Court: Then I .think the appropriate question would be 
the administrative application of it. . 
Mr. McGuire: I was going to ask him that next. 
Q. I will ask you, !Ir. Vil elch, what has been the practical 
construction by yourself and the Commissioner of the Reve-
nue of that paragraph (b) ; to tax new and used car sales 
or new car sales only or used car sales only or what t 
A. vVell, at the time tllat this was in effect-it has since 
been replaced by another_:_it applied to a new car dealer 
whose new car sales are reported at a specific location and 
that opens a location or other locations in the city. 
Q. But is this tax of $200 plus .34 of 1 % of the gross re-
ceipts of the business, is that a tax measured by _110w car 
sales or used car? 
A. No, exclusively by the sales of used cars. 
By the Court : 
Q. Of used cars f 
page 65 ~ A. Used en rs per location. 
Bv Mr. McGuire: 
0 Q. And if he sells new cars at another location, under what 
section are those new cars sold? -
Mr. ¥oncure: If you will amend tl1e question by your 
practice. 
A. If he would sell-primarily what takes place in the 
business is this: They sell new cars, take trade-ins and on 
occasions buy and sell used cars they did not trade in, also do 
repair and servicing. So at the primary location it would 
be on the gross receipts $20 and .34 cents a 100 where the entry 
fee and rate is the same. That would be the license at the 
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primary location. At any addition to the primary location 
the primary rate would be $200 with the subsequent addition 
for the volume exceeding $52,941.00 .. 
Q. What is the flat rate on the retail merchant's section? 
A. There is no such thing as flat rate in the retail mer-
chant's_:. 
Q. I beg your pardon. \Vhat is tbe rate f 
A. $20 entry plus 34 cents per $100 on gross receipts. 
Q. At what rate would you tax a man's n,ew car sales at 
this other location? 
A. There would be an entry fee of $20 plus 34 cents a hui1-
dred, and in addition to the sale of new cars if he 
page 66 ~ also did servicing and repairing that would be ii1 
his gross receipts volume. 
Q. Now suppose a man sold both new and old cars at the 
same place of business¥ · 
A. The ordinance sets out when he sells both at the same 
place of business he pays $20 plus 34 cents per 100 on his 
gross receipts, but when he opens np a separate place of 
business he becomes liable for the minimum license of $200 
plus 34 cents a hundred on the excess of sales or gross sales 
above $52,941.00. 
Q. I call your attention to Section 10.305 of that pamphlet 
you have in your hand. It is titled "Designation Place of' 
Business''. Are you familiar primarily with this section and 
with the similar sertion of the state law. 58-2J5? 
A. I am very familiar with the city· ordinance; I do not 
claim familiaritv with the state tax code 
Q. Can you sity whether or not the city ordinance follows 
or parallels the state code '1 
A. It parallels it in part. On other occasions it takes a 
different approach. 
Q. I mean these two sections. 
A. This particular section is designed directly after the 
same _sectio·n of the state code. 
Q. "What have you in practice construed it to mean? 
A. It has been construed, as we understand it to 
page 67 ~ be, that every location doing business in Richmond 
must have a separate and distinct license. 
Q. I call your attention to 10.306: Persons engaged in more 
tban one trnde, business, occupation or profession. What 
have von eoustrucd that to mean? 
A. \Ve have construed that to mean that every person en-
gaged in a classification set out in the license code must have . 
a Jicense for that clm;sifieation at the location, even though 
there may be many classifications li~ensed at a location. 
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Q. Suppose he is eugaged in more than one of these classi-
fied businesses at the same location? 
A. If he is engaged in more than one of these classified 
businesses at the same location that carried the same tax rate, 
he may secure a license on the total of the receipts from the 
various occupations or professions and one license would he 
sufficient. 
Q. Suppose they have different entry fees or different rates? 
A·. If the rates or entry fees are different~ then he hm; to 
have a license for each classification carrying a different rate 
or entry fee and the rate. 
Q. Do you know if the City Council on or about December 
26, 1950, adopted any general revision of the city 
page 68 ~ license chapter, including license revision? 
A. Yes, there was a revision, more in language or 
clarification and to recodify it as long as the state code had 
been revised. It was adopted by the Council on December 
26, 1950, effective 1951. 
Q. This ordinance was in effect during 1951 and '52? 
A. That ordinance has been in effect since then with several 
minor amendments. 
Q. This ordinance wl1ich is in evidence and marked Exhibit 
17, is that the ordinance of which you speak? 
A. That is right. 
Q. I call your attention to Section 10-87 of this ordinance. 
I believe paragraphs (a) and (b) of the current ordinance 
correspond to paragraphs (b) and ( c) of the 1947 ordinance? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. ,v ould the stu tements you have made with reference to 
paragraphs (b) and ( c) of the 1947 ordinance and their prac-
tical interpretation apply to paragraphs (a) and (b) of this 
ordinance? 
A. Identical. 
Q. Under which section of this current ordinance, according 
to your practical construction, are persons who sell new cars 
only and do not sell used cars at all classified f 
A. They would he classified as a retail merchant and assess-
able under Section 10-84. 
page 69 ~ Q. I am going. to ask you to look at Section 10-28 
''Definitions" and paragraph (b) of that: "Gross 
Receipts of the Business.'' That appears to state that the 
phrase gross receipts of the business shall mean gToss sales 
and so forth arising from or growing out of the conduct of 
the business, occupation or profession licensed in this chapter 
during the license tax year immediately preceding the license 
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tax year for which the tax is being computed, without any 
deduction unless otherwise provided. Is that correct Y 
A. That is correct. 
Q. I will ask you now to turn over to Section 10-121 with 
the catchline "License Tax Year." The first clause of that 
appears to read that each license tax year shall commence 
at the date when the license first becomes assessable and shall 
expire on the 31st day of December following the date when 
said license first becomes assessable. As administered and 
in practice, when does a license first become assessable f 
A. A license becomes assessable for one who has been in 
business the previous year on the first day of January, it 
being permissible to obtain the assessment during the month 
of January, and expires with the calendar year December 
31st, or if he is a beginner or one who starts business for the 
first time as a beginner or at a new location, it would begin 
the time he begins business and expire on December 31st of 
that year. 
page 70 } Q. With reference to the expiration Section 
10-123 so provides, does it not, that the license shall 
expire--
A. That it shall terminate with the calendar year for which 
it is issued. 
Q. I will ask you to look at 10-124, "Designation of Place 
of Business." It that substantially similar to Section 10-305 
of the 1947 ordinance and the state law 58-245? 
A. It is very similar, if not identical language. 
Q. What do you interpret that to mean f 
A. I interpret that to mean every license that is issued 
must carry a definite place of business and a license must be 
secured for each such place of business. 
Q. To avoid repetition, Section 10-125, persons engaged in 
more than one trade, business, occupation. or profession, is 
that substantially similar to Section 10-306 of the 1947 ordi-
nance? 
A. Practically the same. 
Q. Are your statements with regard to the various sections 
the same-
A.. Exactly the same. 
Q. Do they apply to this section? 
A. Exactly. 
Q. Now I ask you to look at Section 10-122, entitled: "Be-
ginner''. You have been in court this morning and 
page 71 } have heard the· evidence, have you not 7 
A. Yes, sir. 
52 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
D . .Andrew Welch. 
Q. You are familiar with the facts with regard to Lynn 
Pontiac, Inc. Y 
A. Very familiar. 
Q. Under Section 10-122 as applied when Lynn Pontiac 
opened up the used car lot at 817 Hull Street in 1951, did this. 
section apply to that loU 
A. The section applied to th~ adjustment made subsequent 
to his procuring. the license at the end of that calendar year 
and we so audited and so requested the Commissioner to 
assess on the basis of the audit. 
Q. I was going to ask you that, but meant to ask you first 
why were they required to take out a license based on au 
estimate 1 
A. ·wen, they were new in business at the location and they 
had previously accrued liability for the entire volume at the 
location 804-828 since they had been in business there for 
twenty-one days of the calendar year 1951. So it was in 
effect a new business at a new location. 
Q. \V" as the same thing true when tµey opened up the lot 
at 1428 Hull Stre.et in 1952 f 
A. Subsequently they procured a license for the new loca-
tion-the new business at a new location. 
page 72 ~ Q. Is Lynn Pontiac, Inc., the only concern rn 
Richmond that is in the same situation Y 
A. Not by any meai1s. 
Q. Roughly, how many would you say there are¥ 
A. \Vell, I haven't tried to count them. I would estimate 
probably twenty-five or thirty automotive dealers in the city 
and most of them do have separate lots from which they 
sell used cars or quite a substantial part of them do. 
Q. Have you received complaints or objections from other 
dealers? 
A. ·wen, we always receive complaints and objections from 
the taxpayer whenever you call upon him, but they have not 
objected to the extent they have not complied. 
Q. Not any? 
A. I say they have all complied to the best of my knowledge 
and belief and we obtain information from the Motor Vehicle 
Commissioner's office ascertaining those locations are open 
and the inspectors check them constantly. 
Q. Has any dealer declined to pay the tax assessed on his 
used car lot? 
A. This assessment here has been paid. There is only one 
assessment that is open that has been made and the under-
standing is that we would refrain until this matter had been 
determined. 
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Q. You are not aware of any one else? 
page 73 ~ A. I am not aware of any others. I think I might 
. say that I can assure you if I were aware of any 
others we would have proceeded against them. 
(At 1 :15 o'clock p. m. the court recessed for lunch until 
2 :15 p. m., at which time the hearing was resumed with the 
same witness on the stand.) 
Mr. McGuire: If the Court please, before Mr. Moncure 
starts his cross examination I expect this is the appropriate 
time for me to offer this opinion of the City Attorney because 
it is addressed to Mr. "\Velch. Mr. Moncure is going to object 
to its admissibility, but I believe he has agreed that this is a 
copy of an opinion issued by Mr. Drinanl. I offer this be-
cause it is in evidence Mr. Drinar<l ha<l some conference with 
Mr. Lynn an<l l\fr. Welch and for that reason I offer this 
opinion No. 1162, dated 1\..ugust 15, 1952, issued by him to Mr. 
D. Andrew ·welch, City License Inspector, on the subject of: 
''Licenses; motor vehicle dealers who sell new motor vehicles 
at one place of business and used motor vehicles at another 
place of business, .separate licenses required; beginners." 
There is matter in this opinion that relates to another motor 
vehicle dealer who is in substantially the same situ-
page 74 ~ ation. Of course, I am offering it in the Lynn Pon-
tiac case. I will be perfectly willing to say I am 
offering it only as to Lynn Pontiac, except that it is very 
much intertwined, the opinion starts off discussing the other 
dealer. 
(File<l and marked Exhibit No. 25.) 
Mr. Moncure: I object to the introduction of the opinion 
in evidence in so far as it does express opinions and is argu- · 
mcmt. It is a memorandum written between agents of the 
City Govemrnent, from the City Attorney to :Yir. Welch, and is 
purely n self-serving· declaration. 
1'.Ir. McGuire: I would not have offered it except for the 
previous evidence. 
'I11ie Court: I think it may be a~lmitted solely for the pur-
pose of showing to what extent Mr. Drinard was in doubt at 
any time and whether his doubt was clarified by a study, and 
not be introduced for the purpose of showing what his opin-
ion on the matter is as far as competent evidence in Court is 
co1werned. It is simply on the issue of his doubt and the reso-
lution of his doubt, if any. 
Mr. McGuire: I except to your ruling on the ground that 
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the way having been opened by Mr. Moncure's 
page 75 ~ questioi1s th~ t the opinion is now admissible for 
every purpose. 
Mr. Moncure: I will except for the reasons I stated a· 
moment ago. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Moncure: 
Q. Mr. Welch, I direct you attention to Section 10-87, Ex-
hiLit 17. Would you rea<l the heading of that Section 10-8H 
.A.. "Motor Vehicle Dealers (Used Vehicles)." 
Q. "\¥hat do you take that to mean? 
A. That those assessed under that section handled used 
vehicles on occasion and primarily on most occasions. 
Q. Under that Section 10-87 is there any provision for tax- · 
ation of one who handles ne,,r cars'/ 
A. Not exclusively. 
Q. Well, new cars and used cars¥ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You have testified that it was the practice of the City of 
Richmond to tax those who deal in new cars only as retail 
merchants under Section 10-84; is that correct Y 
A. That is right. 
Q. What has been your practice in taxing these motor ve-
hicle dealers who sell used cars only under 10-84 
page 76 ~ with respect to trades they may take in Y 
A. "\V ell, the retail merchants in various lines 
accept trade-ins, wliic·h is an accepted principle that the trade-
ins carry out the same status as a credit and when they are 
sold are reported as sales or part of the gross receipts. 
Q. Under 10-84. · 
A. Not only in this category, but in other businesses as well. 
By the Court: . 
Q. Let me get that question and answer straig·ht. If I 
understood the question, it is where a person engages in sell-
ing a new car, but takes in a used car as part of the purchase 
price thereof and thereafter sells that used car-
A. I understood him to say when we tax a new c~r dealer, 
but if he took in trade used cars he would be taxed under 
10-87 as the basis of his tax if he handles used cars. Is that 
what you meant · 
By Mr. Moncure: 
Q. Under your interpretation of 10-87 (a) as I understand 
it, you would tax the new: car operation under 101-84-
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A. No, I didn't say that. 
Q. Where do you tax the new car dealer? 
A. Clarify what type of business you refer to and I can give 
you the category. 
page 77 } Q. A new car dealer who sells new cars at one 
place of business and sells used cars he takes as 
trade-ins at another place of business; how do you tax that 
situation? 
A. If he is a new car dealer and takes trade-ins, he would 
pay a license at his primary location on his volume of g·ross 
receipts· 1ess the trade-ins. When those trade-ins-
Q. Under what section would that be? 
A. It could be assessed under either 10-84 as a. retail mer-
chant or could be assessed under 10-87 ( c). Bo.th carry the 
same rate. 
Q. I started my question by saying that he sold the used 
cars at another place of business. 
A. vVell, the same situation would apply here. He is taking 
under section ( d )-it specifies how you ·compute your 
gross receipts when you figure second-hand vehicles to be 
sold at another location. 
Q. But my understanding from you and the procedure you 
have used in the past that you have taxed new car dealers who 
sell used cars at another place of business-you have taxed 
the new car operation as a retail merchant under 10-84? 
A. The rate is identically the same. 
By the Court: 
Q. The question is under what section is he taxed? 
A. Well, Section (c) specifies that every motor 
page 78 } vehicle dealer selling new or used vehicles or both 
at the same place of business, whether taken in 
trade or purchased for re-sale, shall pay a license tax of $20. 
Q. That is not the state of facts; not at the same place of 
business. The question is new car busin·ess at one place and 
second-hand car business at another place. 
A. He would be taxed as a retail merchant if he made new 
or used car sales at one place and as a used car dealer he sold 
at another location. 
By Mr. Moncure : . 
·Q. How do you treat the new car sales which you are tax-
ing under 10-84 when the trade-in is made on the new car? 
A. We ,vould treat the gross receipts as gross receipts of 
the sale, allowing credit for. the trade-in, which would then be 
reported as a sale u~der 10-87 when sold. 
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Q. Under what authority would you allow such credit under 
10-84? 
A. Under the authority here set out in 10-87 which has 
been permitted in other lines of business and under authority 
of the opinion from the City Attorney's office. 
Q. Then you are taxing him under 10-84, hut then relying 
on 10-87 (d) to see how to treat his used cars? 
A. ,ve possibly could tax him on his gross receipts with no 
allowance if we did not follow the language in ( d) 
page 79 ~ which stipulates a new car dealer is allowed credit 
on trade-ins. 
Q. Doesn't that give some significance to ( d) ? In other 
words, if 10-84 does not make any allowance for the same thing 
that ( cl) does or 10-87-if there is no provision which would 
permit this credit under 10-84-
A. I think you have to define what constitutes a sale. Under 
your gross receipts a credit could easily be interpreted as not 
a gross receipt. 
By the Court: 
Q. You consider gToss receipts as receipts in the form of 
money and not in the foi·m of some chattel or other service 
rendered? In other words, if I go into a new car dealer and 
pay all cash for a new car, there is no question the gross re-
ceipts is all the cash 1 
A. As you are probably aware, Judge, there are many 
types of merchandise that are sold where a trade-in item is 
accepted against the sale price. So the net price would be 
the sale until that itern is sold and then it would become a sale 
-the trade-in item. It is a common practice in merchandising 
that is done. 
Q. Anyway, that is the principle you go on, that he has 
not received anything until he has disposed of the thing he did 
receive 0l 
A. That is correct. 
page 80 ~ Q. For the purpose of ascertaining gross re-
ceipts f 
A. He may not receive the amount of credit that was allowed 
or he may receive more than the credit allowed. It has no 
value. until it has been disposed of. 
vVi tness stood aside. 
• * 
A Copy-Teste: 
H. G. TURNER, Clerk. 
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